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THE FUTURE OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
POLICY: LEARNING LESSONS FROM
REPUBLICAN JUDICIAL APPOINTEES IN
THE GUIDELINES ERA
DAVID M. ZLOTNICK*

In the two years since the landmark Booker decision, federal
sentencing policy has been in a state of suspended animation. This Article urges federal sentencing reform advocates
to look to an unlikely source for realistic goals and ideological support-the experiences of Republican judicial appointees in the Guidelines Era. Its findings are based upon a
long-term research project into cases in which Republican
appointees stated their disagreement with the sentences required by law from the bench. The Article discusses the primary product of my research, forty comprehensive case profiles and their policy implications. Specifically, the Article
demonstrates how the lessons of these Republican appointees
are relevant to three of the critical issues in the post-Booker
sentencing debate: first, the need for mandatory minimums,
second, the desirability of a legislative 'Booker fix," and finally, specific areas for reform, such as the disparity between
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crack and powder cocaine sentences, that might have traction in what is likely to be a cautious Democratic Congress
on criminaljustice issues. By making use of these judges' insights, I argue that the sentencing debate can transcend
tough-on-crimeposturing to smart-on-crimepolicies that better protect both public safety and the public fisc. The Article
concludes by drawing on these judges' words and deeds to
construct a rhetorical framework for meaningful, bipartisan
sentencing reform in the post-Booker era.

INTRODUCTION
Congress should not be distracted by off-the-mark suggestions that [mandatory minimum sentencing] is a soft vs.
tough-on-crime issue. I am a former prosecutor and I chair
an agency that views crime control as the most important
So the real issue is how to most efgoal of sentencing ....
fectively, efficiently, and fairly, achieve this important goal.'
-The

1
Honorable William W. Wilkins, Jr.

In the two years since the landmark Booker decision, 2 federal sentencing policy has been in a state of suspended animation. While many academics and judges were pleased that the
decision returned a modicum of sentencing discretion, conservatives in Congress and the Justice Department immediately
sought to devise a "Booker fix" to reverse the decision. Nevertheless, the Republican majority was unable to coalesce around
a particular legislative solution before it lost control of Congress in the 2006 midterm elections. With the new Democratic
majority, sentencing reformers have been re-energized and are
considering ambitious post-Booker proposals from academia
and sentencing reform groups. 3 Still, their optimism may be
1. U.S.S.C. on Mandatory Minimums: Testimony of Judge William W. Wilkins, Jr., Chairman of the United States Sentencing Comm., 6 FED. SENT'G REP.
67, 67 (1993). Judge Wilkins, appointed in 1986 by Reagan, served as the Chair of
the U.S. Sentencing Commission from 1985-1994.
2. Booker v. United States, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
3. See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, Conceptualizing Booker, 38 ARIz. ST. L.J.
387, 416-23 (2006) (advocating a closer look at the constitutional guarantee of a
jury trial, and suggesting a system that better balances the roles of the judge and
the jury in sentencing); Frank 0. Bowman III, Mr. Madison Meets a Time Machine: The PoliticalScience of Federal Sentencing Reform, 58 STAN. L. REV. 235,
256-59 (2005) (advocating for a simplified and more lenient guidelines system);
see

also

THE

CONSTITUTION

PROJECT

SENTENCING

INITIATIVE,
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misplaced. Modern sentencing policy has seemingly defied the
law of gravity. With few exceptions, 4 penalties that go up seem
to stay up because politicians of both parties fear being labeled
soft on crime. 5 Therefore, this Article urges sentencing advocates to look to an untapped source for realistic goals and ideological support-the experiences of Republican judicial appointees during the mandatory Guidelines Era.
These findings are drawn from a long-term research project that included anonymous interviews of federal judges and
research on cases in which federal judges stated from the bench
their disagreement with the sentence required by law. 6 The
most recent product of this effort is forty comprehensive profiles of these cases, all involving Republican appointees. This
Article discusses the profiles and their policy implications and
also provides internet links to the profiles for readers, researchers and policymakers.
Part I briefly lays out the pre- and post-Booker sentencing
regime, paying attention to what Booker did and did not
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FEDERAL CRIMINAL SENTENCING IN A POST-BOOKER
at
available
(2006),
11-18
WORLD
(providing an
http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/SentencingRecs-Finall.pdf
outline of a simplified federal guidelines system); Kate Stith & Karen Dunn, A
Second Chance for Sentencing Reform: Establishing a Sentencing Agency in the
JudicialBranch, 58 STAN. L. REV. 217, 220-33 (2005) (advocating the creation of
a Judicial Sentencing Agency in the Judicial Branch composed of a majority of
federal judges).
4. See infra pp. 38-42, discussing the "safety-valve," which is 1994 legislation that permitted judges to sentence low-level offenders below a mandatory
minimum in certain limited situations. The Violent Crimes Control and Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322 § 80001, 108 Stat. 1796, 1985 (1994) (codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (1994 & Supp. II 1996) and U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 5C1.2 (2006)).
5. See Sara Sun Beale, What's Law Got to Do with It? The Political, Social,
Psychological and Other Non-Legal Factors Influencing the Development of (Federal) Criminal Law, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 23, 40 (1997); see also Dan Schnur,
Davis Won by Toeing the GOP Line: Democratic CandidatesAre Using the Conservative Agenda to Win Elections, but Where Does That Leave Republicans?, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 5, 1998, at B9; Jason Belmont Conn, Felon DisenfranchisementLaws:
PartisanPolitics in the Legislatures, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L. 495, 513 (2005) ("In
today's political atmosphere, being viewed as 'tough-on-crime' is electorally beneficial. A politician benefits from a perception that he will make preventing crime
and punishing offenders priorities of his term in office.").
6. See David M. Zlotnick, Shouting Into the Wind: District Court Judges and
Federal Sentencing Policy, 9 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 645 (2004); David M.
Zlotnick, Symposium on Sentencing Rhetoric: Competing Narratives in the PostBooker Era, 11 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 449 (2006); David M. Zlotnick, The
War Within the War on Crime: The CongressionalAssault on JudicialSentencing
Discretion, 57 SMU L. REV. 211, 227-28 (2004).
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change, and explains the two-year sentencing policy stalemate
since the decision. Part II explains the importance of case
studies for sentencing policy and elaborates upon my rationale
for using a Republican appointee data set. Part III explores
the root causes of Republican appointee dissatisfaction during
the mandatory Guidelines Era and isolates four kinds of cases
that most distressed these judges. Part IV shows how the lessons of Republican appointees from the Guidelines Era are directly relevant to three of the critical issues in current sentencing policy: first, the need for mandatory minimums; second, the
desirability of a legislative "Booker fix" proposal; and finally,
specific areas for reform that might have traction in what is
likely to be a still cautious Democratic Congress on criminal
justice issues. Part V draws on these judges' statements and
deeds to provide a theoretical and rhetorical framework for
moderate but meaningful sentencing reform. The Conclusion
ends with a plea for the new Congress to listen to these federal
judges. By making use of these judges' insights, I argue that
the sentencing debate could move from tough-on-crime posturing to smart-on-crime policies that better protect both public
safety and the public fisc.

I.

THE SENTENCING WORLD BEFORE AND AFTER BOOKER

A. The Federal Sentencing Regime in the Pre-Booker
Years
1.

The Sentencing Guidelines

Before Booker, twenty-five years of "tough-on-crime" politics had dramatically altered the sentencing universe in the
federal courts. Before 1984, federal sentencing permitted unfettered judicial sentencing discretion and significant back-end
parole board power with a strong emphasis on rehabilitation.
However, perceived sentencing disparities and judicial leniency
led to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 ("SRA"). 7 By abolish7. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3626 (2000 & Supp. III 2003); 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998
(2000). On the federal level during the 1960s and 1970s, a bipartisan consensus
began to form that unfettered judicial and parole board discretion resulted in too
much sentencing disparity. The prevailing account of the reform movement is
that it was liberals, such as Judge Marvin Frankel, who initially pushed for sentencing reform, arguing that racial minorities and the socio-economically disadvantaged received harsher sentences. Later, conservatives, interested in a more
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ing parole, the SRA solved the problem of post-sentencing disparity. 8 At the front end, the SRA created the United States
Sentencing Commission ("Sentencing Commission"), which
mandates the creation of a sentencing guideline system for all
federal crimes. After three years of controversy, the Sentencing Commission released the first version of the Sentencing
Guidelines in 1987. 9 The critical feature of the new Guidelines
was their mandatory nature. In the majority of cases, judges
were restricted to a narrow sentencing range somewhere on a
138-box sentencing grid. 10 The vertical axis of the grid was
controlled by the offense level (and offense-related characteristics);"I the horizontal axis by features of the defendant's crimipunitive and determinate system, joined and eventually came to dominate the
coalition. See KATE SMITH & JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING
GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 35-37 (1998).

8. The statute requires inmates to serve at least 85% of their sentences. See
18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1) (2000) (limiting good behavior credit to fifty-four days per
year).
9. The first Commissioners had significant conflicts over substantive and
procedural nature. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, Dissent from the United States
Sentencing Commission's Proposed Guidelines, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1112 (1986); Janet Alberghini, Comment, Structuring Determinate Sentencing
Guidelines: Difficult Choices for the New Federal Sentencing Commission, 35
CATH. U. L. REV. 181 (1985).
10. The SRA requires that each box on the grid prescribes a range with a high
end generally not more than twenty-five percent longer than the low end. There
were two initial exceptions. First, the government could elect to move for a
downward adjustment based upon a defendant's cooperation with law enforcement. Second, the Guidelines also made provisions for exceptions called "departures" which allowed a judge to go above or below the applicable guidelines range
if the judge found that the case fell outside "the heartland" of circumstances and
factors considered by the Sentencing Commission. Some departure grounds were
affirmatively recognized by the Guidelines, while others, such as age, socioeconomic background, gender, and substance abuse were specifically forbidden or
discouraged. All departures, and in fact all Guidelines calculations, were made
subject to judicial review. Despite encouragement from the Supreme Court in the
Koon case, many appeals courts remained hostile to creative uses of the departure
power. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 97 (1996) ("Indeed, the text of § 3742
manifests an intent that district courts retain much of their traditional sentencing
discretion."). See, e.g., United States v. Rybicki, 96 F.3d 754, 757-59 (4th Cir.
1996). The 2002 Feeney Amendment further cut back on this option. See
PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 103, 117 Stat. 650, 669 (2003) (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 3553(b)(2));.see also Zlotnick, The War Within the War on Crime, supra
note 6, at 213 ("The Feeney Amendment provisions have the potential to gut
downward departures .... ).
11. Every crime is assigned an initial base offense level. Additional factors
can then raise or lower the offense level: for example, the defendant's role in the
offense or the defendant's acceptance of responsibility (by pleading guilty), or obstruction of justice (lying at trial). U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§
3E1.1, 3C1.1 (2006).
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nal record. 12 For offenses involving narcotics and financial
loss, the Sentencing Commission chose to set offense levels
largely based upon the quantifiable component of the crime.
This choice resulted in drug sentences being driven more by
drug amounts than culpability factors. The Commission also
amplified the impact of an offense's quantifiable component by
adopting a "real offense" sentencing system. "Real offense"
sentencing required the sentencing judge to look at all related
"relevant conduct" to determine the offense level, not just the
conduct related to the offense of conviction. 13 Thus, in drug
cases, relevant conduct soon became more important than the
offense of conviction.
2.

Mandatory Minimums for Narcotics and
Firearms Offenses

However, the pre-Booker sentencing regime had another
component as important as the Sentencing Guidelines: mandatory minimum statutory penalties that operated independently
of the Guidelines. The most significant modern mandatory
minimums, those for narcotics offenses, were born in the wake
of the national outcry that followed the cocaine-induced death
of Boston Celtic draft pick Len Bias. 14 Congress responded
12. The horizontal axis of the Guidelines quantifies the defendant's criminal
history. Points are assigned for prior convictions based on factors such as seriousness, remoteness, and whether the current offense was committed while on
parole or probation. Based on the total criminal history points, a defendant is
placed in Criminal History category I-VI, with the applicable sentencing range
escalating in the higher categories. Once a defendant's adjusted offense level and
criminal history category are determined, the Guidelines direct the sentencing
judge to a range on the grid. For example, a defendant with an offense level of
twenty-six and a criminal history category of I was subject to a sentence that falls
between sixty-three and seventy-eight months. See id. § 5A ("Sentencing Table").
13. For example, assume a defendant was found guilty of one count of possession with intent to distribute cocaine based upon evidence obtained in a single
seizure. Nevertheless, the Guidelines require that the base offense level include
any other drug transactions or contemplated transactions that involved the same
course of conduct. See id..
14. See Eric E. Sterling, The Sentencing Boomerang: Drug ProhibitionPolitics
and Reform, 40 VILL. L. REV. 383, 408-12 (1995) (discussing the expedited course
pursued by then House Speaker Tip O'Neill in seeking passage of the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act in order to placate constituent outrage over the cocaine overdose death
of Boston Celtics basketball star Len Bias). At the time, most thought that Bias
died of a crack overdose, leading to a hysteria over that drug in particular. Later,
it was determined that his death was due to snorting powder, not smoking crack.
See Marc Mauer, The Disparity on Crack-Cocaine Sentencing, BOSTON GLOBE,
July
5,
2006,
available
at

2008]

THE FUTURE OF FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY

7

with the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 ("the 1986 Act") which
created quantity-based mandatory minimums for most drug
felonies. 15 These mandatory penalties started at five and ten
years for fairly minor quantities, 16 and escalated to twenty
years and life without parole for recidivists. 17 In 1988, Congress extended the reach of the drug mandatory minimums by
making them applicable to conspiracy charges to possess or distribute narcotics. 18
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial-opinion/oped/articles/2006/07/05/the
disparity-on-crackcocainesentencing/.
15. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (codified
at 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2000)).
16. The 1986 Act also increased drug sentences in more subtle ways. For example, quantity was now determined by the weight of the entire "mixture or substance," not just the amount of actual narcotics present. While the increase was
intended to punish dealers who increased their sales by using cutting agents, the
result was that drugs that are generally heavily diluted or that require a "carrier
medium," were now virtually certain to trigger a mandatory minimum penalty.
The best example of the "carrier medium" effect was found LSD cases. Because
the weight of an actual dose of LSD is negligible, too small to be put into a pill or
vial, it is generally impregnated onto sheets of paper, with individual doses identified by stickers or decals. Because a ten-year mandatory sentence requires only
ten grams of LSD, most LSD dealers who used paper of a regular weight easily
exceeded the ten gram requirement. For example, from October 1995-September
1996, 39.8% of LSD defendants received at least a ten-year mandatory minimum
sentence. An additional 39.8% received a five-year mandatory minimum. U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N, 1996 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 53
(1996), available at http://www.ussc.gov/annrpt/1996/tab-38.pdf.
17. According to contemporaneous Congressional statements, the bill's mandatory minimums were supposed to be targeted at the drug kingpins and wholesalers who were responsible for importing and distributing narcotics on a national
or regional scale. For instance, Congress intended "the Federal government's
most intense focus ought to be on major traffickers, the manufacturers or heads of
organizations, who are responsible for creating and delivering very large quantities of drugs." H.R. Rep. No. 99-845, at 11-12 (1986). Accordingly, Congress
adopted quantities to trigger mandatory minimums "based on the minimum
quantity that might be controlled or directed by a trafficker in a high place in the
processing and distribution chain." Id. at 12. However, the triggering quantities
were lowered as Democrats and Republicans, and the House and Senate, each
tried to out-tough each other. See Sterling, supra note 14. For example, the 1986
Act requires five- and ten-year mandatory minimums for just five and fifty grams
of crack cocaine, amounts generally transacted by the lowest level street dealers.
Id.
18. See The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690 § 6470,
(amending 21 U.S.C. § 846). Before this amendment, drug distribution conspiracies were covered by the general federal conspiracy statute, which carries a maximum five-year sentence. With the 1988 bill, not only were more cases eligible for
the mandatory penalties, but these defendants were now subject to punishment
for the entire quantity of drugs in the conspiracy of which they were aware or
should reasonably have been aware. Moreover, because modern conspiracy law
requires little active involvement before one is deemed to have joined a conspir-
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During the Guidelines Era, Congress also added important
mandatory minimum penalties for offenses involving firearms.
In 1984, the penalty for using or carrying a firearm during a
violent crime was made a consecutive, five-year mandatory
term. 19 In 1986, Congress extended this penalty to drugtrafficking crimes, and increased the mandatory minimum to
ten years for certain types of firearms. 20 In later amendments
to this statute, Congress increased the penalty for a "second or
subsequent conviction" to a consecutive and mandatory minimum of twenty years, and then again to twenty five years. 2 1 In
1986, Congress also passed the Armed Career Criminal Act
("ACCA"), which made possession of a firearm or ammunition
by a felon with three prior convictions for "crimes of violence"
subject to a fifteen-year term mandatory minimum. 22 This new
fifteen-year mandatory minimum applied even to an ex-felon's
simple possession of a firearm (or even a bullet), without any
requirement of related criminal conduct. 23
3.

The First Sentencing Commission and the New
Mandatory Minimum Statutes

The new drug and gun mandatory minimums were problematic for the first Sentencing Commission, which had largely
been relying on past sentencing data to establish the penalties

acy, even taking a phone message or giving a ride to a friend is enough, so long as
a jury believes the defendant agreed to assist the primary actor. See, e.g., United
States v. Esparsen, 930 F.2d 1461, 1471-72 (10th Cir. 1991) (recognizing that to
be found guilty of conspiracy, "[tihe defendant need not know all the details of the
operation and may play only a minor role or have only a slight connection to the
conspiracy . . . [and that while mere] presence at the scene of the crime does not,
by itself, prove involvement ... [it] is a material factor.").
19. See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, §
1005(a), 98 Stat. 1837, 2138 (1984).
20. See Firearm Owner's Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 104(a)(2)(A)(F), 100 Stat. 449, 456-57 (1986).
21. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6212, 102 Stat. 4181,
4360 (1988).
22. Firearm Owners' Protection Act, § 104(e) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)).
Possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (regardless of whether the felony was
a state or federal conviction) had been a federal offense since 1968 but the mandatory minimum was just a year. See Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618 §
102(924)(b), 82 Stat. 1213, 1224 (1968).
23. As will be discussed infra, Part III, the definition of what constituted a
"crime of violence" was also defined very broadly.
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for the draft Guidelines. 24 Because the new mandatory minimums were substantially higher than past drug sentences, the
first Commission decided to use the mandatory minimums to
set the floor for most Guideline sentences for drug offenses.
Quantities above the amount necessary to trigger a mandatory
minimum were set incrementally higher. With this decision,
the Commission guaranteed that most Guideline drug sentences would be even more severe than the new mandatory
minimums. The Commission chose this route, in part, because
the Commission was powerless to permit sentences below a
mandatory minimum. 2 5 The only exception initially provided
by Congress was a government controlled motion for defendants who cooperated in the investigation and prosecution of
another offender. 26
4.

The Impact of Prosecution Policies on the PreBooker Sentencing Regime

While Congressional action created the Guidelines and the
new mandatory minimums, it is critical to recognize the role
that prosecutorial policy set by the Justice Department and the
charging practices of local United States Attorneys Offices
played during the pre-Booker years. At the start of the Sentencing Guidelines Era, the Reagan Administration declared a
federal "War on Drugs" and stressed the importance of increasing drug and gun prosecutions and issued tougher plea policies

24. Symposium, Alternative Punishments Under the New Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, Speech by Commissioner Ilene H. Nagel, 1 FED. SENT'G REP. 96, 103
(1988) (stating that the Commission chose to, "in its first iteration of guidelines,..
. anchor the sentencing guidelines to estimates of past practice, that is, to estimates of time actually served," to wit the "research staff provided [the Commission] with analyses of 10,000 cases as well as additional data for a larger sample
of 40,000 cases.").
25. As statutory penalties, the mandatory minimums trumped the Guidelines.
For example, if the Guidelines called for a sentence of seventy to eighty-seven
months, but the statutory mandatory minimum called for ten years, the Guideline
sentence had to be adjusted to 120 months. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 5Gl.l(b) (2006).
26. Judges were powerless to sentence below a mandatory minimum even
when the defendant makes a good faith effort to cooperate but is unable to do
enough to satisfy the government. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e); see also United States
v. Wade, 504 U.S. 181, 183-84 (1992) (holding that judges have "no power to go
beneath the minimum" without a "substantial assistance" motion from the prosecution).
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that called for more severe sentences. 2 7 The budgets of the
Justice Department and federal law enforcement agencies such
as the FBI, DEA, and ATF also ballooned. 28 In response, federal prosecutors brought many more of these drug cases, either
from federal law enforcement or by accepting cases initiated by
arrests by city and state law police, acting alone or in concert
with federal agencies. 29 As a result, federal prosecutions rose
from 59,682 in 1986 to 116,582 in 2004, with narcotics enforcement leading the increase by a substantial margin. 30 Ad-

27. Under the "Thornburgh Memo," federal prosecutors across the country
were told to charge and obtain a conviction and sentence on the most serious conduct in an indictment that could be readily proven. See Memorandum from Richard Thornburgh, Attorney General, to Federal Prosecutors (Mar. 13, 1989), reprinted in THOMAS W. HUTCHINSON & DAVID YELLEN, FEDERAL SENTENCING LAW
AND PRACTICE: SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDICES VOLUME 621 (1989) (commonly
known as "the Thornburgh Memo").
28. Karin Graham Horwatt, An Attorney Is Not A Rolls Royce: The Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984 and the Sixth Amendment Right to Effective Assistance of Council After United States v. Monsanto, 1 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 145,
166-67 (1992).
29. In President Reagan's October 1982 remarks announcing federal initiatives against drug trafficking and organized crime:
[t]he president called for (and got): (1) more personnel-1,020 law enforcement agents for the Drug Enforcement Agency, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, and other agencies, 200 assistant U.S. attorneys, and 340
clerical staff; (2) more aggressive law enforcement--creating 12 regional
prosecutorial task forces across the nation "to identify, investigate, and
prosecute members of high-level drug trafficking enterprises;" (3) more
money-$127.5 million in additional funding and a substantial reallocation of the existing $702.8 million budget from prevention, treatment,
and research programs to law enforcement programs; (4) more prison
bed space-the addition of 1,260 beds at 11 federal prisons to accommodate the increase in drug offenders to be incarcerated; (5) more stringent
laws-a 'legislative offensive designed to win approval of reforms" with
respect to bail, sentencing, criminal forfeiture, and the exclusionary rule;
(6) better interagency coordination-bringing together all federal law enforcement agencies in "a comprehensive attack on drug trafficking and
organized crime" under a cabinet-level committee chaired by the attorney general; and (7) improved federal/state coordination, including federal assistance to state agencies by training their agents.
Steven Wisotsky, A Society of Suspects: The War on Drugs and Civil Liberties,
NO.
180,
n.35
(Oct.
2,
1992),
CATO
POL'Y
ANALYSIS
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-180.html (citing President'sMessage Announcing
Federal Initiatives Against Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime, 18 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. DOC. 1311, 1313-14 (Oct. 14, 1982)).
30. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASE
DATA,
2002:
WITH
TRENDS
1982-2002, RECONCILED
PROCESSING,
(last visited Sept. 10, 2007);
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/fccp02.htm
TRAC Reports, Inc., Federal Judicial District (U.S.): Number Prosecuted
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ditionally, beginning in 1991 with Attorney General Thornburgh's "Project Triggerlock," federal firearms indictments also
dramatically increased as successive administrations encouraged local federal prosecutors to pursue felon-in-possession and
other federal firearm violations. 3 1 The impact of the increase
in penalties and the more aggressive prosecution policies on
the federal criminal justice system was staggering. In 1984,
the federal prison population was 32,317 and by 2007 it stood
at 199,510.32

B. The Post-Booker Sentencing World
1.

The Booker Decision & the End of Mandatory
Guidelines

This section first discusses the impact of Booker on the
sentencing regime and then moves on to describe the policy
stalemate that followed. The Booker opinion has two separate
majorities. The "merits majority" held that the Sixth Amendment forbids any judicial fact finding that results in a manda-

http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/136/include/table_3.html (last visited Sept. 23,
2007).
31. See infra note 193 for a discussion of Project Triggerlock and its successor
programs.
32. See
Federal
Bureau
of Prisons,
Weekly
Population Report,
http://www.bop.gov/locations/ (follow "Weekly Population Report" hyperlink) (last
visited Sept. 10, 2007). These changes also dramatically altered the makeup of
the federal criminal docket. In 1983, drug cases accounted for only 16% of the
federal district court criminal docket. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
FEDERAL
CRIMINAL
CASE
PROCESSING
1982-93,
www.ojp.usdoj.govlbjs/pub/pdf/fccp93.pdf (last visited Sept. 10, 2007) . With the
war on drugs and the shift of more drug cases to the federal system, the numbers
skyrocketed. In 2003, drug cases accounted for over 27% of criminal cases filed.
See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS' ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT:
FISCAL
YEAR
2003
14
(2003),
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/reading-room/foiamanuals.html (follow "2003" hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 23, 2007). As a result, over 53% of current federal inmates
are serving sentences for drug offenses. The average federal drug sentence before
1984 was 65.7 months. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, NATIONAL PROFILE
AND
ENFORCEMENT
TRENDS
OVER
TIME,
http://trac.syr.edu/tracdea/findings/national/drugpri8199.html (last visited Nov.
28, 2007) (on file with the Iowa Law Review) [hereinafter TRAC study]. By 1991,
the average federal drug sentence increased to 95.7 months. While there has been
a slight decrease in drug sentences over the past ten years, the increase in the
federal prison population has continued as the total number of prosecutions has
continued to increase. Federal prosecutions rose from 71,437 in 1995 to 116,582 in
2004. See TRAC Reports, supra note 30.
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tory increase in a defendant's sentence. 33 That kind of fact
finding, Booker holds, is reserved for juries. As a result, the
provisions of the SRA that made the results of judicial Guideline calculations mandatory are unconstitutional. Thus, the
"merits majority" is the portion of the opinion that killed the
mandatory Guidelines that had governed federal sentencing
34
since 1987.
A separate "remedial majority," authored by Justice
Breyer, held that the best way to effectuate Congressional intent in the SRA was to make the Guidelines "advisory" in nature but otherwise uphold the rest of the SRA. 3 5 Thus, Booker
instructs judges to continue to calculate and consider the
Guideline range, but also requires them to weigh all the sentencing factors set forth in the SRA codified at 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a). In addition, the "remedial majority" held that the
Court of Appeals should continue the review of sentences on
appeal, but instituted a "reasonableness" standard of review.
The reasonableness standard was itself the subject of a recent Supreme Court decision, Rita v. United States, which held
that the Courts of Appeals may apply a "presumption of reasonableness" within Guidelines sentences. 36 While it was
33. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 225-44.
34. The merits majority in Booker was the culmination of a revolutionary line
of Sixth Amendment jurisprudence that did not exist when the Sentencing Guidelines were born. See Peter B. Rutledge, The 2004 Gunderson Lecture: Apprendi,
Blakely, and Federalism, 50 S.D. L. REv. 427, 432 (2005); David Yellen,
Reuschlein Lecture: Saving Federal Sentencing Reform After Apprendi, Blakely,
and Booker, 50 VILL. L. REV. 163, 168-69 (2005).
35. Booker, 543 U.S. at 244-68.
36. 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2462 (2007). The Court noted, however, that while called
a "presumption," it is neither binding nor burden shifting. Rather, the Court reasoned that by the time a Court of Appeals reviews a within Guidelines sentence,
both the Sentencing Commission (in the abstract), and the District Court (under
the specific facts of the case), have already deemed that the applicable Guideline
range adequately weigh the § 3553(a) factors. Id. While the majority also emphasized that this permissible "presumption" does not apply at the district court, Justice Souter argued in dissent the decision creates strong incentive for sentencing
judges to stay within the Guidelines and thus may preserve "the very feature of
the Guidelines that threatened the jury trial right." Id at 2487. Another highly
anticipated case on reasonableness, Claiborne v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 551
(2006), which concerned appellate review of sentences outside the Guidelines, was
dismissed after the defendant died after argument but before an opinion was issued. However, the Court quickly replaced Claiborne with Gall v. United States,
No. 06-7949, 127 S. Ct. 2933 (2007) and Kimbrough v. United States, No. 06-6330,
127 S. Ct. 2933 (2007). Gall will consider whether a defendant must show extraordinary circumstances to justify a substantial variance below the Guidelines
range. Kimbrough will consider to what extent, if any, a district court can base a
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widely hoped that Rita would clarify the reasonableness standard, as noted by Professor Doug Berman, the case is "more
likely to create continued confusion because everyone will be
able to find some passages to their liking. ' 3 7 Nevertheless, the
initial consensus is that while Rita might make it harder to
challenge within Guidelines sentences in some circuits, the
opinion will not significantly shift the prevailing post-Booker
38
sentencing practices.
However, it is critical to recognize that while judges are no
longer strictly bound by the Guidelines ranges, the statutory
mandatory minimums for drug and gun offenses survived
Booker intact. Mandatory minimums were not affected by
Booker because unlike the Guidelines, which require a series of
judicial fact finding decisions, mandatory minimums generally
have a one-fact trigger which can easily be submitted to a jury.
In fact, since at least 2000, federal prosecutors have been
charging and proving the fact required to trigger mandatory
39
minimums in most criminal cases.

variance on its disagreement with the policy underlying the Guidelines treatment
of an offense, in this case for crack cocaine.
37. See Sentencing Law and Policy Blog, Rita Has Something for Everyone
(Except
Victor
Rita),
June
21,
2007,
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencinglaw-and-policy/2007/06/rita-hassometh.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2007).
38. Victor Rita was tried and convicted of perjury, making false statements,
and obstruction of justice for his conduct into an investigation of illegal machine
gun "kits." Rita, 127 S.Ct. at 2459. His Guideline range was 33 to 41 months. Id.
at 2461. He tried to argue that his twenty-five years of stellar military service
made a within Guidelines range sentence unreasonable under Booker but that argument was rejected by the Supreme Court and his sentence of 33 months was
affirmed. Id. at 2470. For an overview of the case see Linda Greenhouse, Justices
Support Guidelinesfor Sentencing, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2007, at A18. For a more
detailed discussion of Rita and reactions to it, see generally Douglas A. Berman,
Rita, Reasoned Sentencing, and Resistance to Change, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 7
(2007).
39. This trend was the result of prosecutors' attempts to not run afoul of the
Supreme Court's opinion in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), the first
case in the line of Sixth Amendment cases that ultimately led to Booker. See
Memorandum from Christopher A. Wray, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Criminal Division, to All Fed. Prosecutors, on Guidance Regarding the
Application
of Blakely
v.
Washington to
Pending
Cases,
at
8,
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencinglaw-and-policy/files/chris
wraydoj-me
mo.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2007). For drug mandatories, indictments included
the quantity trigger and for felon-in-possession cases, the fact that the defendant
had been previously convicted of a felony offense.
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The Politics of Stalemate

At the end of Justice Breyer's remedial majority, he explicitly recognized Congress' right to have the final word on sentencing policy. 40 Given that Booker outraged conservatives,
who viewed the opinion as a judicial coup d'etat, 4 1 many commentators initially believed it was only a matter of time before
Congress acted. 42 For more than two years, however, that
didn't happen. Some credit restraint on the part of the Sentencing Commission, the Judicial Conference, many commentators who repeatedly advocated a "go slow" and "wait-and-see"
approach-essentially a rearguard action designed to maintain
the Booker status quo. 4 3 More importantly, for two years, dis40. "Ours, of course, is not the last word. The ball now lies in Congress' court.
The National Legislature is equipped to devise and install, long term, the sentencing system, compatible with the Constitution, that Congress judges best for the
federal system of justice." Booker, 543 U.S. at 265.
41. Rep. Tom Feeney (R-FL), said that "The Supreme Court's decision to
place this extraordinary power to sentence a person solely in the hands of a single
federal judge-who is accountable to no one-flies in the face of the clear will of
Congress," and added that the decision was an "egregious overreach." See Stop
the Drug War, Supreme Court Ends Current Federal Sentencing System, Jan. 14,
2005, http:l/stopthedrugwar.org/chronicle-old/370/bigruling.shtml
(last visited
Sept. 23, 2007). According to a defense attorney group, "[tihe Justice Department
is livid" over the opinion as well. Id. (quoting Jack King, Commc'ns Dir. for the
National Assoc'n of Crim. Def. Lawyers); see also Congress' Reaction to Booker
and Fanfan, TALKLEFT, http://www.talkleft.com/story/2005/01/13/498/98079 (last
visited Sept. 23, 2007); Testimony of Daniel P. Collins, former Fed. Prosecutor and
Deputy Attorney Gen., before Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec.
(Feb. 10, 2005) (on file with author) (claiming that Booker "effectively demolish[ed] in one stroke the entire edifice of federal sentencing reform that has been
carefully built over the last 20 years.").
42. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. See Pamela A. MacLean,
Cracking the Code: After Booker Judges Reduce Crack Cocaine Sentences, 27
NAT'L L. J. 1 (Oct. 3, 2005); see also Bowman, supra note 3, at 257-58; Andrew D.
Leipold, Why Are Federal Judges So Acquittal Prone?, 83 WASH. U. L. Q. 151, 222
n.255 (2005).
43. See, e.g., Paul J. Hofer, Immediate and Long-Term Effects of United States
v. Booker: More Discretion, More Disparity, or Better Reasoned Sentences?, 38
ARIz. ST. L.J. 425, 462-63 (2006) (citing examples of the go slow approach); Sandra D. Jordan, Have We Come Full Circle? JudicialSentencing Discretion Revived
in Booker and Fanfan, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 615, 675 (2006) (urging everyone to take a
"wait and see" approach to sentencing post-Booker); Ronald F. Wright, Incremental and Incendiary Rhetoric in Sentencing After Blakely and Booker, 11
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 461, 468-71 (2006) (noting that judges have taken
varied approaches in sentencing post-Booker to try to mitigate Congressional
backlash to their actions); see also Judges Urge Congress to Respond Slowly to
U.S. Supreme Court's Sentencing Guidelines Ruling, DAILY RECORD (Rochester,
NY), Feb. 25, 2005, 2005 WLNR 3138287 (reporting on testimony before Sentencing Commission from judges urging caution in responding to Booker); Testimony
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trict judges showed significant restraint in exercising their
newly recovered discretion and largely continued to sentence as
if the Guidelines were still mandatory. Thus, Sentencing
Commission data from the first two years after Booker reveals
only a slight increase in sentences below the advisory Guidelines ranges. 44
In addition, at least in the initial post-Booker period, conservatives struggled to find a viable "Booker fix." Justice Department prosecutors were not in favor of jury sentencing, fearing that complicated verdict forms would spell more
acquittals. 4 5 While some new mandatory minimums were proposed, these bills did not gain sufficient traction as the Iraq
war and other issues had more resonance with the public than
crime in the streets. 4 6 However, as more post-Booker data became available, conservatives began to hone their message that
both leniency and sentencing disparity were on the rise, claiming to have found troubling individual sentences as well as senof Judge Paul G. Cassell, Chairman, Judicial Conference Comm. on Criminal
Law, before Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. on How Judges
are Properly Implementing the Supreme Court's Decision in United States v.
Booker
(Mar.
16,
2006),
available
at
http://www.utd.uscourts.gov/judges/cassell-final.pdf; stating on behalf of the Judicial Conference that there is no need for any immediate action on sentencing legislation); Letter from More than Forty Former U.S. Attorneys to the Senate and
House
Sentencing
Committees
(Mar.
1,
2005),
available
at
http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/75164f8d67544f8a85256adaOO66b78e/386f8f20304
la2e285256fbe006f593c?OpenDocument#news0O
(follow top "click here" hyperlink) (advocating Congress "go slow" when considering responses to the Booker
decision).
44. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FINAL REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF UNITED
STATES
V. BOOKER ON FEDERAL
SENTENCING
(2006),
available at
http://www.ussc.govbookerreport/Booker-Report.pdf
(finding that sentencing
severity has remained constant, above guidelines range sentences doubled to 1.6
percent and that sentences below range did not substantially increase in percentage or scope).
45. See Reply Brief for the United States at 11, United States v. Booker, 543
U.S. 220 (2005) (Nos. 04-104, 04-105) (the U.S. Government emphasized that "requiring jury verdicts on sentence-enhancing facts would produce a distorted and
unmanageable system that would regularly produce sentences that were not proportional to the offense of conviction, failed to recognize important differences between defendants, and failed to operate in a consistent manner.").
46. See Manuel Garcia, Jr., How Will the Iraq War Affect Americans?, SWANS
(SPECIAL
ISSUE
ON
IRAQ),
Feb.
2,
2004,
http://www.swans.com/library/artlO/iraq/garcia.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2007)
("The typical American is most likely to feel the political effect of the Iraq War as
a diminishing of any public discussion of social welfare issues, because 'the war'
and 'diminished resources' have made the passage of such social legislation more
remote.").
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tencing patterns that justified the re-imposition of restrictions
47
on judicial discretion.
At the macro level, conservatives noted that sentences outside the Guidelines increased ten percent in the first thirteen
months after Booker. Looking deeper into the data, they also
cited to particular districts where compliance with the Guidelines was below fifty percent, buttressing their claim that 'qiberal pockets" of judges were undermining uniformity. 4 8 Lastly,
they pointed out that downward variances from the sentencing
guidelines under Booker now exceeded upward variances by a
ratio of 22:1, reflecting judicial efforts to undermine the sever49
ity of the sentencing regime.
With this ammunition, in 2006, conservative legislators
started to promote more aggressively new and broader mandatory minimums. 50 Separately, the Justice Department and at
least one key conservative Congressman settled on the concept
of "topless" guidelines as their favored "Booker fix solution. ' 5 1

47. For example, on June 21, 2005, Attorney General Gonzalez cited a child
pornography case in which he claimed a judge had used his newly returned discretion to award a lenient sentence to dangerous individual. He also cited a different case that resulted in an upward variance from the Guidelines to warn about
an increase in sentencing disparity post-Booker. The full texts of his remarks are
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2005/06212005victimsofcrime.htm.
But see NADCL Report: Truth in Sentencing? The Gonzales Cases, 17 FED. SENT.
R.
327
(June
2005),
available
at
http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/newsreleases/2005mnOlO (defending these sentences as justified by differences in the offenders and the offense).
48. Statement of William M. Mercer, United States Attorney for the District
of Montana before the Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism,
and
Homeland
Security,
Mar.
16,
2006,
available
at
http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/mercer031606.pdf;
see also Jeff Eckhoff,
Data Show More Variety In Sentencing Some Judges Use Too Much Discretion,
Are Too Lenient, Critics Say, DES MOINES REGISTER, Mar. 19, 2006, available at
http://www.november.org/stayinfolbreakingO6/SentencingData.html;
Sean
O'Sullivan, State's Judges Showing More Leniency, THE NEWS J., Apr. 8, 2005,
available at www.delawareonline.com (reporting claims of Delaware U.S. Attorneys Office that Delaware federal judges are sentencing below the Guidelines in a
large percentage of cases).
49. O'Sullivan, supra note 48.
50. See Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109248, 120 Stat. 587 (2006) (codified in sections of 18 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.) (seeking
to apply mandatory minimums to participants in gang violence); Methamphetamine Epidemic Act, H.R. 3889, 109th Cong. (2005) (seeking to apply mandatory
minimums to methamphetamine users). See infra notes 204-05 for a discussion
of the gang bill.
51. See Remarks prepared by Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez given at the
National Center for Victims of Crime First National Conference, 21 June 2005,
Washington
D.C.,
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Under a "topless guidelines" regime, the lower end of a defendant's guideline range would be established by the facts found
by the jury. However, instead of the current narrow ranges in
each box on the grid, the upper end of every defendant's range
would be the statutory maximum for each crime. The proponents of "topless guidelines" believe that this arrangement
would technically comply with Booker, because sentences above
the minimum would be at the discretion of the judge, not dependent on any mandatory judicial fact finding. 52 But, by instating a mandatory sentence floor based on the jury verdict,
judges would be prevented from lowering sentences based on
non-Guideline factors currently allowed by the Booker deci53
sion.
The Democratic Congressional victories in the 2006 midterm elections undeniably slowed the momentum for topless
guidelines and encouraged sentencing reform advocates to believe that legislation to ameliorate some of the worst inequities
of the current regime might be possible (such as the disparity
between crack and powder cocaine sentences). In addition,
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2005/O6212005victimsofcrime.htm (last visited,
Oct. 14, 2007). Rep. Sensenbrenner, who chaired the Judiciary Committee in the
House, introduced H.R. 1528, "Defending Americas Most Vulnerable: Safe Access
to Drug Treatment and Child Protection Act of 2005." Section 12 of the Act would
have eliminated all downward departures from the Guidelines range, thereby not
just "fixing"' Booker but going further and ensuring that there would be no sentences below the Guidelines range without a government motion. See Topless
Guidelines Bill in the Works from Sensenbrenner, SENT'G L. & POL'Y BLOG, Mar.
30, 2006, http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencinglaw-and-policy/2006/03/ topless-guideli.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2007). See infra pp. 60-61 for a discussion
of the debate on the constitutionality of "topless guidelines."
52. See Gina Holland, Judges Press Sentencing Commission on FederalGuidelines,
LAW.cOM,
Nov.
18,
2004,
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1100535357414 (quoting Assistant Attorney
General Christopher Wray that "[o]f all the legislative proposals being discussed
as possible solutions," the topless guidelines bill "adheres most closely to the principles of sentencing reform-truth-in-sentencing, certainty and fairness in sentences, and the elimination of unwarranted sentencing disparities."); see also
Douglas A. Berman, Tweaking Booker: Advisory Guidelines in the Federal System,
43 HOUS. L. REV. 341, 357-58 (2006) (suggesting that topless provisions would
likely be constitutional in an advisory guidelines system). But see U.S. District
Judge Paul Cassell, Written Testimony of Judge Cassell at the Booker HearingBefore the House Judiciary Committees Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, reprinted in 18 FED. SENT'G REP. 198 (2006) (stating that the constitutionality of "topless provisions" hinges largely on the vitality of the Supreme
Court's decision in Harris v. U.S., 536 U.S. 545 (2002), but that Booker seriously
calls Harrisinto question).
53. See infra pp. 60-61 for a more detailed discussion of the merits of "topless
guidelines."
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there has been renewed attention to broader, structural issues
such as the Guidelines' over-reliance on quantity-based sentencing and prosecutorial charging practices that result in draconian mandatory minimum sentences. 54 This Article now
turns to how the case profiles of Republican appointees can be
used to continue to forestall reactionary Booker fixes such as
more mandatory minimums or "topless guidelines" and to determine if there are sentencing reform issues for which there
may be broad support within the judiciary.
II.

THE CASE FOR THESE CASE STUDIES IN SENTENCING POLICY

A. Why Case Studies?
The Sentencing Commission, the Justice Department, and
groups such as The Sentencing Project 55 publish and analyze a
myriad of data about sentencing decisions, and there is much
to learn in these numbers. My research, in contrast, employed
the case study method. As a result of this methodological
choice, this Article makes no claims of statistically significant
results. Nevertheless, the case study method has much to offer
sentencing policy makers. 5 6 First, while the media has long
54. For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see infra pp. 54-58, discussing the "stacking" of consecutive and escalating 924(c) gun counts.
55. See The Sentencing Project, www.sentencingproject.org (last visited Oct.
14, 2007).
56. My methodology is discussed in more detail on my website at
http://faculty.rwu.edu/dzlotnick/federalsentencingstudy.html (last visited Oct. 14,
2007). Initially, I conducted about twenty-five telephone and in-person interviews
of federal judges. In a few districts, I spoke to multiple judges. For larger districts, I talked to just a few but spread these out over the country. I tried to obtain interviews based on personal contacts, not because a judge had a reputation
for having strong views about sentencing. Once at the courthouse, many judges
were willing to pass me onto the next office as well. Because most of these judges
preferred to remain anonymous, to obtain cases to profile, I searched the files of
Families Against Mandatory Minimums ("FAMM"). For over ten years, FAMM
has been collecting information from federal inmates about their cases. FAMMs
basic case summary form, sent into prisons through their publications asks: "Did
the judge say he wished he didn't have to give you such a long sentence?" See generally Families Against Mandatory Minimums, http://www.FAMM.org (last visited Oct. 14, 2007). These files helped identify possible judges to research. I then
followed up with the inmates and their families to obtain sentencing transcripts
and Presentence Investigation Reports ("PSIs" or "PSRs"). Due to changes in Bureau of Prison regulations in 2002, obtaining PSIs became very difficult. Thus,
while the prerequisite for follow-up was that a judge spoke out at sentencing, inclusion of a judge and a case in the forty profiles was governed by my ability to
obtain sufficient official documentation about the case. While I sent the draft pro-
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reported judicial complaints about sentencing policy in a variety of formats, this Article and its profiles offer the most detailed portraits of individual federal cases from the mandatory
Guidelines Era that are currently available on the Internet for
use by researchers and policymakers.
Second, the case study method is particularly well-suited
for exploring sentencing policy because of the Anglo-American
tradition that the punishment should fit the crime. Indeed, the
march of the modern criminal law and sentencing policy can be
seen as an effort to match culpability and social harm with the
appropriate punishment. 57 Thus, simply knowing the percentage of judicial downward departures or other aggregate statistics about the application of the Guidelines reveals very little
about the qualitative nature of the cases and whether the sentence in an individual case was in accord with the sentencer's
notions of just punishment. Only by looking at a select number
of cases in-depth can policymakers obtain the richer context
necessary to evaluate whether a particular judge's desire to
impose a less harsh sentence is consistent with mainstream
values or represents a dangerous leniency that needs to be cabined by legislative restrictions on discretion.
Third, case studies offer other insights that would be
missed by only looking at aggregate data. For example, in
these profiles the judges stated their reservations about the
length of the sentence in open court but did not bend the
Guidelines calculations or the rules for downward departures
(as critics argue judges routinely do). As a result, these cases
never showed up in departure statistics or anywhere else that
would capture these judges' concerns. Only by gathering the
sentencing transcripts and the pre-sentence reports was I able
to capture this otherwise hidden cross-section of cases and the
underlying policy issues they represent. Fourth, these case
profiles also provide a much needed counterweight to the negafiles to the judges, their willingness or unwillingness to comment did not affect
whether I decided to publish the profile. Please note that all references to
"Anonymous Interviews" in this Article reference conversations with Republican
appointees.
57. See Aaron J. Rappaport, Rationalizing the Commission: The Philosophical
Premises of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, 52 EMORY L.J. 557, 596 (2003)
("[M]ainstream just desert theory considers two factors to be critically important
in assessing culpability-the mental culpability of the defendant and the actual
harm caused by his or her conduct."); see also Arnold H. Loewy, Culpability, Dangerousness, and Harm: Balancing the Factors on which our Criminal Law is
Predicated,66 N.C. L. REV. 283 (1987-1988).
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tive image of the federal judiciary advanced by conservatives
over the past twenty-five years. 58 In my profiles, although the
defendants are arguably less culpable or less dangerous than
envisioned by Congress when it predetermined the punishments that applied, these judges followed the law despite their
desire for a different result. In other words, these case studies
provide a storehouse of "dog-did-not-bite-man," counter-stories
to add balance and realism to the often distorted debate over
59
sentencing policy and judicial discretion.
Fifth, reproducing portions of the transcripts in the profiles captures the human element of sentencing. No statistics
can match the power of the moment when personal conscience
conflicts with fidelity to office. In these profiles, one can hear
these judges try to explain their lack of discretion, express
their outrage at Congress, and sometimes apologize to the defendant (while at the same time not condone or excuse the defendant's criminal conduct). But these transcripts are more
than monologues; they are also conversations with the defendants. While a few of these defendants are defiant and angry,
most tended to apologize to the judge, family, and community
for the harm they caused, even as they complained about the
unfairness of the sentence or the trial. Many can be seen trying to come to terms with their fate. A select few are able to
show surprising insight into the judge's dilemma, even at the
moment when their freedom is about to be taken away. As one
defendant who received a mandatory life sentence put it to the
judge:

58. See, e.g., Stephanie Simon, Call of the West: Rein in the Judges; Conservative Ballot Measures in Many States would Check Judicial Power. South Dakotans Seek a Right to Sue Jurists, Montanans to Recall, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 15,
2006, at Al (noting that conservatives lawmakers are introducing legislation to
curb the actions of what they term "runaway judges"); see also Catherine G. Patsos, Note, The Constitutionalityand Implications of the Prison Litigation Reform
Act, 42 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 205, 254 (1998) (quoting then Senator Bob Dole as "accus[ing] liberal judges appointed by President Clinton of being 'the root causes of
the crime explosion."'); Todd Gillman, GOP Group Plans to Turn Up Scrutiny on
FederalJudges, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 27, 2003 (on file with author).
59. Sentencing policy is too often driven by stories about individual cases.
New criminal offenses are created in response to a particularly heinous crime and
judicial discretion vilified in response to generally poorly explained examples of
supposedly lenient sentences. See Edwin Meese & Rehett Dehart, How Washington Subverts Your Local Sheriff, POLY REV. (Jan.-Feb. 1996), available at
(bemoaning the
http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3585206.html
increase in the federalization of crime including the passage of a federal carjacking and other unnecessary duplications of traditionally state defined crimes).
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I think about it sometimes, your Honor, and I would hate to
be in your shoes . . . because it must be hard for a man to
pass judgment on someone, and maybe he does want to give
him that time, and maybe he doesn't. But I pretty much
know it's out of your hands, and that must be an awful feel60
ing.

B. Why Republican Appointees from the Guidelines Era?
I focused on cases from Republican appointees for several
reasons. 6 1 Law review articles and surveys tend to examine
the judiciary in the aggregate. 62 Moreover, while the media
has reported comments by former Chief Justice William
Rehnquist and Justice Anthony Kennedy that were critical of
reduced judicial discretion and long sentences, 63 no survey or
study has sought to identify the sentencing policy concerns of
Republican appointees at the district court level. By focusing
on Republican sentencers, I hoped first to determine if this
subgroup of judges had distinct concerns (or possibly less severe complaints than their Democratic counterparts). While
60. Sentencing Transcript at 52-53, United States v. Rudy Martinez, No. 91Cr-53 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 23, 1992) (remarks made by defendant Rudy Martinez to
Judge Milton I. Shadur).
61. My initial research included judges appointed by all Presidents. A discussion of additional insights from those interviews and case studies can be found in
my earlier articles and in additional profiles and judicial quotes on the website,
available at http://faculty.rwu.edu/dzlotnicklfederalsentencingstudy.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2007).
62. See, e. g., SMITH & CABRANES, supra note 7.
63. In an August 9, 2003 speech to the American Bar Association, Justice
Kennedy stated that "I can accept neither the necessity nor the wisdom of federal
mandatory minimum sentences. In too many cases mandatory minimum sentences are unwise and unjust .... " U.S. Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy, Address to the American Bar Association (Aug. 9, 2003), available at
http://www.famm.org/PressRoom/PressKit/Judgesspeakout.aspx.
He added that
in the federal criminal justice system, "[o]ur resources are misspent, our punishments too severe, our sentences too long." Id.; see also U.S. Supreme Court Justice
William H. Rehnquist, Luncheon Address, (June 18, 1993), in U. S. SENTENCING
COMM'N, DRUGS & VIOLENCE IN AMERICA: PROCEEDINGS OF THE INAUGURAL
SYMPOSIUM ON CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 286-87 (1993)
("These mandatory minimum sentences are perhaps a good example of the law of
unintended consequences ....
[Tihe mandatory minimums have led to an inordinate increase in the federal prison population and will require huge expenditures
to build new prison space ....
Indeed, it seems to me that one of the best arguments against any more mandatory minimums, and perhaps against some of
those that we already have, is that they frustrate the careful calibration of sentences, from one end of the spectrum to the other, which the sentencing guidelines
were intended to accomplish.").
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this information would be interesting in its own right, given
the politics of criminal justice reform, identifying issues that
most troubled Republican appointees might help sentencing reformers to prioritize their agenda and formulate proposals on
which they might find credible allies.
Second, by excluding Democratic appointees, I hoped to
immunize my findings from accusations that they were biased
by the views of "liberal, activist" judges. In my opinion, for
there to be any movement on sentencing policy, the myth that
only "liberal" judges thought pre-Booker sentences were too
long and discretion too limited must be shattered. The profiles
in this Article provide such ammunition.
To the charge that my sample size is too small and too distant in time to be relevant to the current debate, for the broadest issues discussed in this Article-opposition to mandatory
minimums, mistreatment of low-level offenders, the need to decrease the role of the quantity component in sentencing calculations, and abusive charging practices-there is significant
evidence that the opinions of the profiled judges are within the
mainstream of the federal judiciary in this period. This evidence includes the policy positions and reports of the official
organs of the judiciary, whose committees were dominated
throughout this period by Rehnquist appointees, 64 as well as by
65
broader surveys of the federal judiciary.
64. See
generally
Judicial
Conference
of
the
United
States,
www.uscourts.gov/judconf.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2007) (The federal judiciary
speaks first through the Judicial Conference. The Chief Justice presides over the
Conference whose membership includes the chief judge of each circuit court, the
chief judge of the court of international trade and an elected district judge from
each regional judicial circuit. Much of the Conferences work is done through a
network of committees. The membership of these committees is controlled entirely by the Chief Justice). See Letter from Leonidas Ralph Mecham, Secretary,
Judicial Conference, to Honorable Orrin Hatch, Chairman, Comm. on Judiciary
(Apr.
3,
2003),
available
at
www.uscourts.gov/judiciary2003/feeneyamendment.pdf;
Letter from Sim Lake,
Chairman, Comm. on Criminal Law of the Judicial Conference of the United
States, to Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary, (Apr.25, 2005) (on file with author); see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES: ARE THEY BEING IMPOSED AND WHO IS
RECEIVING THEM? (Nov. 1993); U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM (Aug. 1991) [hereinafter U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT];
BARBARA S. MEIERHOEFER, THE GENERAL EFFECT OF MANDATORY MINIMUM
PRISON TERMS: A LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF FEDERAL SENTENCES IMPOSED (1992).
Prior to the Feeney Amendment in 2002, by statute, a majority of the Commissioners had to be federal judges, balanced by the party of the appointing presi-
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With regard to whether my results are still representative
of Republican appointees in the post-Booker era, I have several
responses. First, many of these judges are still sitting. Second,
the current Judicial Conference and its committees have remained steadfast since Booker in their opposition to mandatory
sentencing and any "Booker fix" that mimics the inflexibility of
the Guidelines. 66 Third, post-Booker, several George W. Bush
appointees have written powerful and influential opinions
criticizing some of the issues highlighted in Part III, including
the crack/powder disparity and prosecutorial "stacking" of fire-

dent. The Commission consistently has recommended that crack penalties be
lowered. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: COCAINE
AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY, at G-145, 5(D)(3) (1995), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/crack/chapl-4.pdf.;
U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL
REPORT TO CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, at 1 (Aug. 1991). I have also collected more than forty
additional public statements of Republican appointees from transcripts and
speeches, in addition to the judges profiled (which are also available on the website http://faculty.rwu.edu/dzlotnick/federalsentencingstudy.html), as well as the
additional anonymous interviews I conducted to supplement my case research. To
the extent that specific issues, such as "924(c) stacking' did not appear on the radar screen of a majority of Republican appointees during the mandatory Guidelines Era, I would contend this was likely a result of differences in local and federal prosecutorial policy, rather than in an endorsement of such policies by other
judges in this cohort.
65. See generally Barbara S. Vincent & Paul J. Hofer, FJCReport on Mandatory Minimum Penalties: The Consequences of Mandatory Minimum Prison
Terms: A Summary of Recent Findings, 7 FED. SEN'G REP. 33 (1994) (90% of federal and state judges surveyed thought mandatory minimums for drug violations
were a bad idea). In 1996, the Federal Judicial Center Survey on sentencing reported that 73% of district and 69% of circuit court judges felt that mandatory
guidelines were not necessary to direct the sentencing process, rather most judges
favored an advisory guidelines system; additionally, 79% of federal district judges
asked, favored the idea of "delinking" the guideline levels from the mandatory
minimums. See MOLLY TREADWAY JOHNSON & SCOTT A. GILBERT, THE U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES: RESULTS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER'S 1996
SURVEY (1997); U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES
SENTENCING: AN ASSESSMENT OF HOw WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM Is ACHIEVING THE GOALS OF SENTENCING REFORM (2004) [hereinafter
FJC SURVEY]; LINDA DRAZGA MAXFIELD, U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SURVEY OF
ARTICLE III JUDGES ON THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES (Mar. 2003).
66. See Letter from Sim Lake, Chairman, Comm. on Criminal Law of the Judicial Conference of the United States, to Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.,
Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary (Apr. 25, 2005) (on file with author) (opposing
Section 12 of H.R. 1528, which contained Rep. Sensenbrenner's "Booker fix," stating "Section 12 does not represent a sound alternative to the present day advisory
guideline system, [and] the Judicial Conference strongly opposes this proposal.").
Judge Lake is a Reagan appointee.
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arm mandatory minimums, 6 7 suggesting that a tectonic shift in
this group has not occurred.68
More fundamentally, even if one is not persuaded that
views of the judges interviewed and profiled for this Article
represent the majority view of Republican appointees on sentencing policy, the very existence of a substantial cohort of Republican appointees who were this outraged by sentencing outcomes undermines the conservative drumbeat that discretion
has to be curtailed to control liberal, soft-on-crime judges. In
fact, for sheer vehemence, some of the rhetoric from these
judges is easily on par with statements by the most liberal Democratic appointees. For example, in explaining his inability
to depart, Judge Lyle E. Strom (D. Utah), appointed by President Reagan, told a defendant that "I know it's no justification
or solace to you, but I am serious when I say this is an outra-

67. In United States v. Perry, Judge William Smith criticized the 100:1 crack
to powder ratio and reflected "[T]he growing sentiment in the district courts is
clear: the advisory Guideline range for crack cocaine based on the 100:1 ratio cannot withstand the scrutiny imposed by the sentencing courts when the § 3553 factors are applied." 389 F. Supp. 2d 278, 307 (D.R.I. 2005); see also United States v.
Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1241-43 (D. Utah 2004) and discussion infra pp.
66-68.
68. It is probably fair to say that George W. Bush judges appointed from 2000
to 2005 tended to be slightly more conservative in political outlook, especially in
their views on "judicial activism," as well as younger. Given their view of judicial
power, and perhaps their own recognition of their relative inexperience both on
and off the bench, fewer of these judges seemed willing to speak out publically
against sentencing policy decisions made by the two other branches, and when
they did so, their statements and opinions tended to show greater deference to
Congress and the President. To the extent that some distinctions can be made by
the appointing President, holdover Nixon appointees were probably the most
vested in the pre-Guidelines rehabilitative ethos. Some of them had cut their
teeth as private and public lawyers in the civil rights era, thus some of these
judges may have been protective of judicial power vis-A-vis the other branches.
For example, Judge Robert Lee Carter (S.D.N.Y.), a Nixon appointee, had previously served in a number of leadership roles within the NAACP including a stint
Federal
Judicial
Center,
General
Council
from
1956-1968.
as
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/tGetInfo?jid=392 (last visited Nov. 15, 2007). Judges
appointed by President George H.W. Bush are also represented in my sample but
they are a hard group to characterize, perhaps because this President had to obtain the advice and consent of a Democratic Senate. Certainly, having come into
the system with the Guidelines already in place, these judges tended to focus their
objections more on specific cases and substantive issues than at the system generally. It is fair to say that some of these judges were considered sentencing moderates and some as conservative by lawyers surveyed by the Almanac of the Federal
Judiciary.
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geous sentence, and I apologize to you on behalf of the United
69
States Government."
Moreover, while all the modern Republican Presidents are
represented here, the largest cohort in my sample are judges
appointed by President Reagan, the first President in the modern era who consciously set about to remake the federal judiciary, and under whose administration the war on drugs began.
The fact that so many Reagan judges were fierce opponents of
the new mandatory minimums and mandatory Guidelines
should shatter the notion that judicial dissatisfaction with the
pre-Booker world can be attributed to a liberal, power hungry
70
judiciary.

III. REPUBLICAN APPOINTEES IN THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES
ERA
This Part begins with a brief overview of what is already
generally known about how Republican appointees viewed the
pre-Booker sentencing regime. This introductory section also
briefly clarifies the occasional confusion in judicial statements
between the Guidelines and mandatory penalties and reveals
69.

See David Zlotnick, Profile of Judge Lyle E. Strom (D. Neb.),

http://faculty.rwu.edu/dzlotnick/profiles/strom.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2007)
[hereinafter Profile of Judge Lyle E. Strom (D. Neb.)]. Similarly, Judge Garnett
Thomas Eisele (E.D. Ark.) labeled one guideline sentence "truly tragic." David
Zlotnick,
Profile
of Judge
Garnett Thomas
Eisele
(E.D.
Ark.),
http://faculty.rwu.edu/dzlotnick/profiles/eisele.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2007)
[hereinafter Profile of Judge Eisele (E.D. Ark.)]. During an anonymous interview,
another Reagan appointee stated: "I feel like an apparatchik in a totalitarian regime ...." Mandatory guidelines are "horrid in theory, worse in practice." Interview with Atlantic Judge 3 (Sept. 6, 2002) (interviewee wishes to remain anonymous). At least one Reagan appointee, Judge John Martin, resigned from the
bench in protest over Congressional restrictions on judicial discretion. See Ian
Urbina, New York's Federal Judges Protest Sentencing Procedures, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 8, 2003, at B1. Please note that all interviews were conducted by the author,
and all quotations are based on his own notes, which are available on file with the
author. In order to protect the wishes of the judges who wish to remain anonymous, their names and the locations of the interviews have been omitted.
70. With the passage of the Guidelines, Reagan judges were being instructed
how to sentence in minute detail by Congress and the Sentencing Commission in
far-away Washington, clearly contrary to the Reagan Revolution's antiWashington rhetoric and federalism themes. In addition, while many of the
Reagan era judges describe themselves as tough-on-crime, many if not most were
not longtime criminal practitioners or deeply ideological about criminal justice
issues before ascending the bench. Lacking the drug warrior mentality that
dominated at Main Justice, some of the outcomes in drug and gun cases seemed a
foolish waste of both financial and human resources.
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how persistent and largely hidden regional differences in federal prosecution policies led to some variation in judicial experiences under the pre-Booker regime. The substantial middle of this Part details the main contribution of this Article-an
exploration of four specific issues that appear to have provoked
the most serious disagreement from Republican appointees in
this period: the disparity between crack and powder cocaine,
sentences for low-level offenders, life or "virtual life" sentences
for more serious, but still non-violent first time drug offenders,
and two kinds of firearms cases involving mandatory minimum
penalties. Here, I make substantial use of materials from my
web-based profiles, as well as providing quotations from my
anonymous judicial interviews.
A.

The Roots of JudicialDissatisfactionwith the PreBooker Sentencing Regime
1.

Mandatory Minimums and the Guidelines

It is well accepted that judicial opposition to mandatory
minimum sentencing was overwhelming during the pre-Booker
period. 7 1 Indeed, abolition of mandatory minimum statutes
has long been the official position of the federal judiciary, including official organs such as the Judicial Conference's Criminal Law Committee (whose members were appointed by Chief
Justice Rehnquist during the Guidelines Era). 72 My research
suggests that rank and file Republican appointees who did not
serve in leadership positions were part of the majority of the
federal judges who opposed mandatory minimum sentencing
laws. 73 Moreover, most Republican judges I interviewed also

71. See Vincent & Hofer, supra note 65; see also Anne Gearan, Supreme Court
Justice Says 2 Million Behind Bars Too Many, DULUTH NEWS TRIB., Apr. 10,
2003, availableat 2003 WL 18613878 (reporting on the critical remarks by fellow
conservative Supreme Court Justice Anthony M. Kennedy).
72. Both the Judicial Conference and its Criminal Law Committee have been
resolute in their opposition to mandatory minimum statutes. See Mandatory Sentences: Committee on Criminal Law of the Judicial Conference of the United
States, 5 FED. SENT'G REP. 202, 202 (1993) (The Criminal Law Committee declaring "the prime requisite for a workable [sentencing] system is to eliminate the
deleterious effects of minimum sentencing mandated by statute.").
73. See FJC SURVEY, supra note 65. Comments from Republican judges interviewed included, 'Most judges find mandatory minimums really difficult.
There is no need for statutory mandatory minimums." Interview with Western
Judge 3 (Sept. 30, 2002) (interviewee wishes to remain anonymous). "I could live
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stated that they saw no need for mandatory penalties because
the Guidelines and appellate review were sufficient to guard
against excesses in judicial discretion. 74
In fact, during the research for my study, only one Republican appointee defended mandatory minimums, but even that
judge acknowledged that his position was more a recognition of
Congress's power to set punishment than an assessment of
their efficacy. 75 In contrast, every other Republican judge interviewed or profiled for this study said that they had personally imposed at least one mandatory minimum sentence (and
sometimes many) that was unnecessary and unjust.
In addition, the majority of Republican appointees I interviewed would have preferred voluntary guidelines or at least
mandatory guidelines with greater room for downward departures. 76 Republican appointees often also agreed with their
with the Guidelines if Congress did away with mandatory minimums." Interview
with Midwestern Judge 2 (Oct. 28, 2002) (interviewee wishes to remain anonymous).
74. Some also noted that mandatory minimum statutes distorted the proper
functioning of the Guidelines. One judge asked, "[w]hy do we need mandatory
minimums if we have guidelines?" Interview with Southern Judge 1 (Sept. 4,
2002) (interviewee wishes to remain anonymous); see also Vincent & Hofer, supra
note 65, at 33 ("[Mlandatory minimums have influenced, and some would say distorted, the guidelines and thus the entire federal sentencing structure"); Henry
Scott Wallace, Mandatory Minimums and the Betrayal of Sentencing Reform: A
Legislative Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, 40 FED. B. NEWS & J. 158 (1993) ("th[e] calibration of minimum sentences ... has corrupted the entire federal sentencing system."). When pressed in interviews about whether any mandatory minimums
made sense, for example, for first-degree premeditated murder, the general response was that because every judge would punish first-degree murderers at or
near the maximum allowed anyway, mandatory minimums for serious violent
crimes were unnecessary.
75. See Letter to David M. Zlotnick, Professor of Law, Roger Williams University of Law, from Judge Paul R. Matia, Northern District of Ohio (July 23, 1998)
(on file with author). Judge Matia indicated that the "right to determine what...
the penalty for [criminal] acts should be, belongs to the people, acting through
their duly elected representatives in our republican form of government." Id. He
"never had a case in which a mandatory minimum sentence troubled [him]." Id.
76. The judicial reaction to the Guidelines and mandatory minimums in the
pre-Booker era was probably the result of the relationship between judicial discretion and sentencing severity. Thus, while it is fair to say that there has been a
strong judicial consensus that Congress has taken too much sentencing discretion
from judges, there is real disagreement over how much discretion judges actually
need. Second, while many federal judges also believed that many post-1986 sentences were more severe than necessary, there again was a wide difference on the
scope of this problem. However, what largely united the judiciary in this period
was that the combination of less discretion coupled with higher penalties created
too great a potential for an unjust sentencing outcome that they were powerless to
affect. However, judges did not always express their disagreement with a sen-
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Democratic counterparts that the Sentencing Guidelines, as
written, were too complex and inflexible and had their own significant problems, both structurally and with regard to specific
offenses. 77 However, because many judges were unhappy with
both the Guidelines and mandatory minimums, their statements in sentencing transcripts and speeches often refer to
them interchangeably. In addition, because the Guidelines and
the drug and gun mandatory minimum penalties became effective in the same general time frame, and because the drug
Guidelines were for all practical purposes pegged to the mandatories, it is sometimes hard to separate out whether a judge's
complaint about a sentence in a case is the result of a mandatory minimum or from the operation of the Guidelines. For this
reason, the profiles discussed in this Part attempt to tease out
in each case whether a particular sentence objected to was the
result of a mandatory minimum, a Guideline provision, or a
combination of both, even if the judges did not do so, to enable
sentencing reformers to determine how to best address these
judicial complaints.
Lastly, while this Part is organized by issue, there is an
important historical aspect to the judicial response to the preBooker sentencing regime that is beyond the scope of this Article. In briefest summary, the initial judicial reaction to the
Sentencing Guidelines and the new mandatory minimums was
tencing outcome in these terms. Rather, many referred either to the discretion
issue or the severity problem, without noting that it is really a combination of
both that has hamstrung their sense of fairness. In addition, there were also areas where some judges, both Democratic and Republican appointees, believed federal penalties were too light. The most common complaint, pre-Sarbanes-Oxley,
was that white collar penalties were too lenient. In addition, in areas such as Indian Country where federal prosecutors also handle crimes usually prosecuted in
the state courts, some judges complained that the Guideline penalties for sexual
abuse crimes were too low, particularly when compared to drug offense penalties.
Interview with Southwestern Border State Judge 1 (Sept. 30, 2002) (interviewee
wishes to remain anonymous).
77. For example, on the Guidelines, one Republican judge noted that "[t]he
present regime requires micro findings and is unduly cumbersome." Interview
with Atlantic Judge 2 (Oct. 15, 2002) (interviewee wishes to remain anonymous).
In particular, the mandatory use of acquitted conduct was singled out as philosophically unfair. One profile in particular in my study demonstrates this issue.
Ala.),
(M.D.
DeMent
Ira
of Judge
Profile
David
Zlotnick,
See
http://faculty.rwu.edu/dzlotnick/profiles/dement.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2007)
[hereinafter Profile of Judge Ira DeMent]; see also Freed, Daniel J., Reforming the
Commission: Internal Rules and Revised Guidelines, 9 FED. SENT'G REP. 64, 65
(1996) (noting that in a 1996 survey, fewer than 20% of district judges and probation officers thought acquitted conduct should be considered at sentencing).
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overwhelmingly negative. 78 However, the federal judiciary's
opposition to the Guidelines softened over time. The softening
process involved a variety of factors too extensive to fully discuss in this Article, but certainly included the following: judges
learning "to live with" the Guidelines, 79 new judges without
pre-Guidelines experience more readily accepting the existing
regime, 80 legislation and Guideline amendments that ameliorated some judicial complaints, 8 1 and moderation of Justice
78. See, e.g., Cynthia K.Y. Lee, A New "Sliding Scale of Deference" Approach
to Abuse of Discretion:Appellate Review of District Court Departures Under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1997); Tracey Thompson, Applying a Formula to Justice: Sentencing Rules Limit Judicial Discretion,
WASH. POST, June 12, 1989, at Al (Reporting sentencing reform "drew immediate
opposition from judges, who saw it as an intrusion by the executive branch into
the judicial domain."). Approximately two hundred judges even held that the
Sentencing Guidelines were unconstitutional as a violation of the separation of
powers doctrine. See, e.g., Gubiensio-Ortiz v. Kanahele, 857 F.2d 1245 (9th Cir.
1988). In 1989, however, the Supreme Court reversed these lower court decisions
and upheld the constitutionality of the Guidelines in Mistretta v. United States,
488 U.S. 361 (1989).
79. When the judiciary realized that it would have to live with this system,
many judges set about to understand how it worked, and to some extent, to test
the limits of their discretion with this framework. Judicial downward departures,
which had been relatively few in the first years, then rose to 8.4% by 1995. See
U.S.
SENTENCING
COMM'N,
ANNUAL
REPORT
(1995),
available at
http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/1995/ANNUAL95.htm.
80. In some percentage of cases as well, the scope of which is subject to significant disagreement, there were judges who obtained outcomes more to their liking by manipulating Guidelines calculations, or by browbeating prosecutors into
more lenient plea offers, or by making other rulings adverse to the government.
Bowman and Heise make a persuasive argument that given the ability of prosecutors to appeal, most cases of "manipulation" of the Guidelines were an exercise in
which judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers were complicit, based on their
joint assessment that the a lesser sentence was appropriate. See Frank 0. Bowman III & Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion II: An EmpiricalAnalysis of Declining
Federal Drug Sentences Including Data from the District Level, 87 IOWA L. REV.
477, 528-29 (2002). I have argued that in some cases, judges, probation officers,
and defense attorneys took the time and initiative to conduct a more thorough investigation of the case and the defendant's background which produced defensible
grounds for a departure. See Zlotnick, Shouting into the Wind: District Court
Judges and FederalSentencing Policy, supra note 6, at 668-69.
81. See The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-322, § 80001, 108 Stat. 1796, 1985 (1994) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)
(1994 & Supp. II 1996), reprinted in U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §
5C1.2 (2006)) (creating the safety-valve, discussed infra pp. 38-42); U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 459 (2006) (amended Nov.1,
1992) (allowing additional Guideline reduction for early plea); Id. amend. 488
(amended Nov. 1, 1993) (amending the manner in which LSD is weighed for sentencing purposes); Id. amend. 503 (amended Nov. 1, 1994) (limiting relevant conduct to quantities transacted after a defendant joined a conspiracy); Id. amend.
505 (amended Nov. 1, 1994) (capping the drug table at Level 38 to prevent life
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Department prosecutorial policies during the Clinton presidency. 8 2 However, the pendulum swung back in 2002, with
more rigid prosecutorial policies by the Bush Administration
and other high profile conflicts with the federal judiciary. 83
2.

Over-Federalization of Crime

My research suggests that over-federalization of crime was
another root cause of Republican appointee dissatisfaction with
the pre-Booker sentencing regime. 84 As lifelong Republicans,
most were quick to champion federalism and states' rights.
Thus, federal prosecutions of small-time drug and gun crimes
were often seen by them as an unwarranted invasion into the
domain of the states' criminal justice systems. One Republican
appointee argued that the combination of overlapping jurisdicsentences based solely on quantity); Id. amend. 516 (amended Nov. 1, 1995)
(amending the manner in which marijuana plants are counted). There was also a
little help from the Supreme Court. See United States v. Koon, 517 U.S. 1234
(1996) (adopting more lenient standard of review for downward departures).
82. Under Attorney General Reno, plea agreements could now be based on "an
individualized assessment of the extent to which particular charges fit the specific
circumstances of the cases." Memorandum from Janet Reno, Attorney Gen., to
United States Attorneys and Litigating Divisions, Principles of Federal Prosecution (Oct. 12, 1993) (on file with author) (more commonly known as the "Reno
Blue Sheet").
83. The most significant conflict with the federal judiciary involved the 2002
Feeney Amendment which placed additional restraints on the already narrowly
circumscribed downward departures and instituted new "depart and tell" reporting provisions, which some judges feared were an attempt to intimidate them
from departing. See Zlotnick, The War Within the War on Crime, supra note 6
(discussing the controversy over the Feeney Amendment and the judicial reaction
to this bill); see also Mark Hamblett, Federal Judges Attack Sentencing Restrictions: Judicial Conference Calls for Feeney Amendment Repeal, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 24,
2003, at 1, col. 1. The second Bush administration also reversed directions on
charging discretion and revoked the Reno Blue Sheet. See Memorandum from
John Ashcroft, Attorney Gen., to All Federal Prosecutors (Sept. 22, 2003) (which
again required pleas to the most severe charge in the indictment and otherwise
attempted to end charge and fact bargaining by prosecutors). The battle over
Terry Schiavo's health care was also a flashpoint between the federal judiciary
and the Congress in this period. See Mike Allen, Delay Wants Panel to Review
Role of Courts: Democrats Criticize His Attack on Judges, WASH. POST, Apr. 2,
2005, at A9 (reporting that House Majority Leader Tom DeLay said that "the time
will come for the men responsible for this to answer for their behavior," after the
refusal of several federal courts to interfere with the Florida judicial system's decisions in the Terry Schiavo case).
84. See Edwin A. Meese, Putting the Federal JudiciaryBack on the Constitutional Track, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 781, 793 (1998) (suggesting that an effective
way to limit judicial activism is for Congress to limit the federalization of crime
and federal jurisdiction in general).
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tion and tougher, federal penalties "distorted the market" for
prosecution, driving too many cases into federal court because
law enforcement quite naturally sought "a higher return."85 A
western Republican appointee went so far as to state that all
the drug cases he had seen so far belonged in state court, as did
fifty percent of the felon-in-possession gun cases.8 6 Some
judges were also concerned about disparity issues, noting that
defendants prosecuted in state court for essentially the same
87
offenses received very different sentences.
The federalism complaint was fueled in part by the dramatic increase in both absolute numbers and the percentage of
the federal docket taken up by drug and gun cases in the
Guidelines Era. 88 In fact, in certain districts, federal district
court practice came to look like a busy urban superior court,
grinding out dispositions with little individualized attention.
One judge in a busy border state noted that on some days, he
might take sixty guilty pleas in minor drug and immigration
cases, forcing a "gang plea" situation with multiple defendants
89
pleading at once.
These judges were also critical of the process of federalization, recognizing that congressional action was often motivated
by a highly publicized crime or crimes, rather than by deliberate study and consideration. 90 In this vein, one judge noted
85. Interview with Atlantic Judge 3 (Oct. 11, 2002) (interviewee wishes to remain anonymous).
86. Interview with Western Judge 1 (Sept. 30, 2002) (interviewee wishes to
remain anonymous).
87. Profile of Judge Lyle E. Strom, supra note 69 (recognizing that defendant's brother and another co-defendant were prosecuted in state court and received significantly less time).
88. Drug case filings increased 65% from 1994 to 2001, surging to more than
80,000 cases per year. Similarly, firearms cases increased exponentially with an
83% increase from 1997 to 2001. OFFICE OF HUMAN RESOURCES AND STATISTICS,
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL

CASELOAD: RECENT TRENDS 8 (2001). In comparison, from 1989 to 1998, the
number of criminal filings increased, but only by 25% in all categories combined.
See PATRICK WALKER & PRAGATI PATRICK, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS, TRENDS IN FIREARMS CASES FROM FISCAL YEAR 1989
AND THE WORKLOAD IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. DISTRICT COURTS (2000), avail-

able at http://www.uscourts.gov/firearms/firearms00.html; see also Frank 0.
Bowman, The Year of Jubilee ... or Maybe Not: Some Preliminary Observations
about the Operation of the Federal Sentencing System After Booker, 43 HOUS. L.
REV. 279 (2006).
89. Interview with Western Judge 5 (Oct. 2, 2002) (interviewee wishes to remain anonymous).
90. Congress federalized a variety of other offenses, such as carjacking and
child pornography, and added mandatory penalties to some of these crimes. Some
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that he thought the carjacking statute was an absurdity. 9 1
Another claimed more broadly that because of federalization,
the federal criminal justice system was so overwhelmed that it
92
"is sliding down the edge of a razor."
Surprisingly, drug warrior fatigue also showed up in some
of the interviews. While most Republican appointees still
voiced their commitment to tough narcotics enforcement
(though not to the severity of sentencing laws), there was a recognition by some that federal intervention seemed to have no
impact on the drug culture and willingness of young men, especially minorities, to engage in drug trafficking. For example,
Judge Matsch (D. Colo.), after being required to impose a
thirty-year sentence on a first-time offender stated, "[Tihe purpose of [the sentence], as I've already indicated, is to try to
warn other people away from it, principally, and I've sentenced
a lot of people and more keep coming. So I don't know. But
'9 3
that's what I must do here.

of the sentences in these cases also troubled individual judges. See Benjamin
Weiser, A Judge's Struggle to Avoid Imposing a Penalty He Hated, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 13, 2004, at Al. More recently, the wave of corporate scandals resulted in
legislative directives to increase the Guideline penalties for white-collar criminals
in the Sarbanes-Oxley bill. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204,
§§ 805, 905, 1104, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (directing the Sentencing Commission to
increase the Guidelines; imposing higher penalties for white-collar offenders
based on a variety of factors). This has recently produced some long white-collar
sentences, such as that of WorldCom Founder Bernard Ebbers, who received a
twenty five year sentence. See Peter J. Henning, White Collar Crime Sentences
After Booker: Was the Sentencing of Bernie Ebbers Too Harsh?, 37 MCGEORGE L.
REV. 757 (2006). Nevertheless, it is fair to say that the story of judicial dissatisfaction during the mandatory Guidelines Era was largely driven by the penalties,
both mandatory and under the Guidelines, for drug and gun cases.
91. Interview with Western Judge 1, supra note 86. Carjacking was federalized pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (2000). The statute was passed following public
outcry when a Maryland woman was killed in the course of a carjacking. See William J. Stuntz, The PathologicalPolitics of CriminalLaw, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505,
532 (2001-2002) (noting that car jackings are rare but that the bill was a "politically valuable symbolic statement to voters.").
92. Interview with Atlantic Judge 3 (Sept. 6, 2002) (interviewee wishes to remain anonymous). On the other side of the coin, judicial critics have asserted that
judicial opposition to the growth of the federal criminal docket is rooted not in
federalism, but in resentment against an increased workload and an elitist attitude about the business of the federal courts. At least one judge interviewed for
this study made comments that sounded in this theme, stating that "federal court
was a special place," and therefore "there should be a very good reason for a drug
case to be in federal court." Interview with Southern Judge 3 (Nov. 2, 2002) (interviewee wishes to remain anonymous).
93. See David Zlotnick, Profile of Judge Richard P. Matsch (D. Colo.),
http://faculty.rwu.edu/dzlotnick/profiles/matsch.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2007).
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However, the degree of concern about over-federalization of
crime seemed to depend heavily on the policies and priorities of
the local United States Attorney's Office in each federal judicial
district. While ostensibly controlled by the Justice Department, in reality local U.S. Attorney's Offices had enough independence during the Sentencing Guidelines Era to shape very
different sentencing environments within which judges had to
operate. 94 For example, studies have shown wide variations in
the willingness of U.S. Attorney's Offices to accept cases for
federal prosecution, with some taking virtually every drug case
brought to them and other offices declining federal prosecution
95
unless a higher threshold quantity of narcotics was involved.
Similarly, inter-district variations in federal prosecutors' willingness to make substantial assistance motions directly impacted the number of defendants who faced mandatory miniA few Republican appointees gravitated to an even more radical stance, especially
with regard to "soft drugs" such as marijuana. One southern Republican judge, in
an area that saw a fair amount of cultivation cases said "[m]arijuana is a fact of
life and we should recognize it. It's no more serious than a martini and one can't
say anymore that it's a stepping stone [to more expensive drugs] because crack is
so cheap in [city omitted]." Interview with Southern Judge 1 (Sept. 4, 2002) (interviewee wishes to remain anonymous). Another argued that all marijuana
cases should be handled in state court as well as the "out the back door" cases.
Interview with Western Judge 1, supra note 86. Sounding much like a liberal
drug reformer, this judge also contended that the war on drugs should be more
about avoiding drug use than fighting drug sales. On the other hand, many other
Republican appointee statements about the war on drugs tend to be more nuanced
and sometimes self-conflicting. Republican appointees expressed ambivalence
about the competence of state courts to address the drug and gun epidemic. These
judges frequently noted that state courts were under-funded and ill-equipped to
deal with the war on crime by themselves, and hence needed federal assistance.
"State courts are in a state of collapse, are under-funded and staffed. They cannot
deal with the fallout of the drug culture." Interview with Atlantic Judge 3, supra
note 92. They also were frequently resentful that state courts were not tough
enough on drug offenders, with one judge arguing that "inefficiency of state
courts" was not a good reason to bring a drug case to federal court. Interview with
Southern Judge 3, supra note 92.
94. The persistence of regionalism in the federal criminal justice system
should not be surprising. Most federal prosecutors and judges had their start in
the local system and do not discard local values and practices overnight. For example, gun cases are often dealt with more seriously in urban areas in comparison
to rural and Western states that have a tradition of personal gun ownership.
While several administrations, including the current one, have attempted to rein
in these offices, local federal prosecutors still have a large degree of autonomy and
have shown varying degrees of fealty to new Justice Department policies. See Ian
Weinstein, Symposium, The HistoricalRoots of Regional Sentencing Variation, 11
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 495 (2006).
95. Zlotnick, Shouting into the Wind: District Court Judges and Federal Sentencing Policy, supra note 6, at 673.
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mum sentences. Other regional differences flowed from differences in crime patterns and jurisdictional anomalies. 96 Examples include the flood of drug and immigration cases in the border states and the higher percentage of violent crime on the
criminal docket in the federal districts that have jurisdiction
over traditional crimes of violence committed within tribal
boundaries. 97 Thus, this Part also tries to note where regionalism issues and the policies of local U.S. Attorney's affected the
consistency of my findings on each of the specific issues discussed herein.
B. Specific Areas of Concern for RepublicanAppointees
1.

The Special Case of Crack Cocaine

There is ample evidence that a majority of the federal judiciary has long believed that sentences for crack cocaine are too
severe in comparison to other drug offenses, most particularly
powder cocaine. The Sentencing Commission has issued reports on this issue four times and twice recommended that
Congress lower the mandatory minimums for crack. In 2007,
the Commission passed an amendment, effective November 1,
2007, that lowers the offense level for crack offenses by two
points.
In September 2006, the Judicial Conference voted in favor
of a recommendation from its Criminal Law Committee that
the disparity between crack and powder cocaine be remedied. 9 8
In addition, many individual judges have also spoken out about
the excessiveness of crack penalties and their disparate racial

96. Even the same statutory offense can look very different depending on the
location. For example, drug cases in border states tend to consist of courier cases
involving large amounts of drugs possessed by low-level operatives. In the inner
cities, drug cases tend to involve more retail and intermediate wholesale.
97. Technically speaking, criminal jurisdiction over Indian Country is shared
between the federal government and tribal governments.
See Kevin K.
Washburn, Tribal Courts and Federal Sentencing, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 403, 405
(2004). However, Congress has conferred jurisdiction in Indian Country on the
federal courts over many violent crimes, such as rape and murder, which ordinarily would not fall to federal jurisdiction. See id.; see also Major Crimes Act, 18
U.S.C. § 1153 (2000); Indian Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2000).
98. That Committee is now chaired by Judge Paul Cassell (D. Utah), a wellknown conservative academic and now judge. See infra pp. 66-67.
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impact. 99 For example, in September 1997, twenty-eight former United States Attorneys, now federal circuit and district
court judges, signed a joint letter addressed to the Chairmen of
the House and Senate Judiciary Committees asserting their belief that "the current disparity between powder cocaine and
crack cocaine, in both the mandatory minimum statutes and
the guidelines, can not be justified and results in sentences
that are unjust and do not serve society's interest.' 100 The letter went on to add that the solution was not to raise penalties
for powder because, the judges wrote, these sentences are already "severe." 10 1 These judges were appointed by every President between Nixon and Clinton and included fourteen Republican appointees. 102
My research suggests that the Republican signatories of
the 1997 former U.S. Attorneys' letter fairly represent the majority view of Republican appointees on this issue, although
there may be a substantial contingent whose sentiment is that
crack penalties should still be somewhat higher than for powder cocaine. 103 For example, other Republican appointees have

99. See David Zlotnick, Profile of Judge William M. Nickerson (D. Md.),
http://faculty.rwu.edu/dzlotnick/profiles/nickerson.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2006)
[hereinafter Profile of Judge Nickerson (D. Md.)]. Public commentary by judges
about crack continues to this day. For example, Judge Reggie B. Walton (D. D.C.),
a Bush II appointee who served as the Associate Director of the Office of Drug
Control Policy under Bush I, recently criticized the sentencing disparity as "unconscionable." Matt Apuzzo, Are Drug Penalties Unfair?: Crack Sentences 'Unconscionable,'JudgeSays, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Nov. 15, 2006, at 36.
100. 1997 Statement on Powder and Crack Cocaine to the Senate and House
Judiciary Committees, reprinted in 10 FED. SENT'G REP. 194, 194-95 (1997-1998).
The same letter was resubmitted to the Sentencing Commission for its 2002 hearings on the issue with twenty-eight judges signing on. See Statement to the
United States Sentencing Commission Concerning the Penalties for Powder and
Crack Cocaine Violations, submitted by Certain United States Circuit Court of
Appeals and District Court Judges Who Previously Served as United States Atat
available
2002),
15,
(Apr.
torneys
http://www.ussc.gov/r_congress/02crack/chl.pdf. (on file with author).
101. See Statement on Powder and Crack Cocaine, supra note 100.
102. The judges who signed the 1997 letter are as follows: Michael Daly Hawkins, Boyce F. Martin, Jr., Gilbert S. Merritt, Jon. 0. Newman, Raymond L.
Acosta, Sarah Evans Barker, Walter E. Black, Jr., Catherine C. Blake, Clarence
A. Brimmer, Robert J. Cindrich, John T. Curtin, Glen H. Davidson, Raymond J.
Dearie, Gustave Diamond, Peter C. Dorsey, John Hannah, Jr. William W. Justice,
William C. Lee, William T. Moore, Frederick J. Motz, Alan H. Nevas, Manuel L.
Real, James M. Rosenbaum, Barefoot Sanders, Fred J. Scullin, Jr., Donald E.
Walter, Rodney S. Webb, George E. Woods. See Statement on Powder and Crack
Cocaine, supra note 100.
103. See infra Part IV.C.1.
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stated that the crack penalties constitute a "grave injustice" 10 4
and that the crack/powder disparity is "completely unaccept06
able," 10 5 and a "discrepancy that has no basis in fact." 1
One example is the case of William Gaines, sentenced by
Judge Robin Cauthron (W.D. Okla., a President George H.W.
Bush appointee). 10 7 Even according to the government's version of the offense, William was not a central figure in the
Oklahoma City cocaine ring that resulted in a twenty-nine
count indictment against twelve individuals in 1994. William
was charged in only two counts: a broad conspiracy count and a
distribution count. 108 The government contended that William
had two roles in the conspiracy, as a "cook and cook trainer"

104. Interview with Midwestern Judge 1 (Nov. 26, 2002) (interviewee wishes to
remain anonymous).
105. Interview with Western Judge 4 (Oct. 17, 2002) (interviewee wishes to
remain anonymous).
106. Interview with Midwestern Judge 2 (Oct. 28, 2002) (interviewee wishes to
remain anonymous).
107. See David Zlotnick, Profile of Judge Robin Cauthron (W.D. Okla.),
http://faculty.rwu.edu/dzlotnick/profiles/cauthron.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2007)
[hereinafter Profile of Judge Cauthron (W.D. Okla.)]. For additional crack cocaine
cases, see David Zlotnick, Profile of Judge Joseph F. Anderson, Jr. (D. S.C.),
http://faculty.rwu.edu/dzlotnick/profiles/anderson.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2007);
David Zlotnick, Profile of Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn (N.D. Ala.),
http://faculty.rwu.edu/dzlotnicklprofiles/blackburn.html
(last visited Oct. 14,
2007); David Zlotnick, Profile of Judge Charles R. Butler, Jr. (S.D. Ala.),
http://faculty.rwu.edu/dzlotnick/profiles/butler.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2007);
David
Zlotnick,
Profile
of
Judge
Ira
DeMent
(M.D.
Ala.),
http://faculty.rwu.edu/dzlotnick/profiles/dement.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2007);
David Zlotnick,
Profile of Judge
Marilyn L. Huff (S.D.
Cal.),
http://faculty.rwu.edu/dzlotnicklprofiles/huff.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2007);
David
Zlotnick,
Profile
of
Judge
Alex
Kozinski
(9th
Cir.),
http://faculty.rwu.edu/dzlotnick/profiles/kozinski.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2007)
[hereinafter Profile of Judge Kozinski (9th Cir.)]; Profile of Judge Nickerson (D.
Md.), supra note 99; David Zlotnick, Profile of Judge Phillip Reinhard (N.D. Ill.),
http://faculty.rwu.edu/dzlotnicklprofiles/reinhard.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2007);
David Zlotnick, Profile of Judge James M. Rosenbaum (D. Minn.),
http://faculty.rwu.eduldzlotnicklprofiles/rosenbaum.html (last visited Oct. 14,
2007); David Zlotnick, Profile of Judge Sam Sparks (W.D. Tex.),
http://faculty.rwu.edu/dzlotnick/profileslsparks.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2007);
David Zlotnick, Profile of Judge Lyle E. Strom (D. Neb.), supra note 69; David
Zlotnick,
Profile
of
Judge
Clyde
Roger
Vinson
(N.D.
Fla.),
http://faculty.rwu.edu/dzlotnicklprofiles/vinson.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2007);
Profile
of
Judge
Richard
W.
Vollmer,
Jr.
(S.D.
Ala.),
http://faculty.rwu.edu/dzlotnick/profiles/vollmer.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2007);
David Zlotnick, Profile of Judge Samuel G. Wilson (W.D. Va.),
http://faculty.rwu.edu/dzlotnick/profiles/wilson.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2007).
108. See Profile of Judge Cauthron (W.D. Okla.), supra note 107.
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and as a distributor of small quantities of crack. 109 While William admitted that he occasionally sold marijuana to support
his family, he denied being part of this cocaine distribution organization. However, based on audio recordings and the testimony of several co-conspirators, William was found guilty.
He was sentenced to 292 months despite being a first offender, in part, because the conspiracy was alleged to have trafficked approximately 10.6 kilograms of crack, which was assessed as relevant conduct against William. At the sentencing
hearing, Judge Cauthron recognized that the sentence seemed
disproportionate to the offense and the offender, but she asserted that there was nothing that she could do about it. She
told William's defense attorney,
[M]any of your arguments are valid ones in specific given
cases. There are times when the [G]uidelines do not result
in fairness or equity. It is of concern to me any time someone with no criminal history can face exposure as high as
Mr. Gaines does based on a first conviction. But, in any
event, the guidelines are the law and they have been found
to be constitutional and the way to change them is through
the political process ....

I am committed by an oath of office

10
to follow the law and the guidelines are the law. I

It also seems fairly certain that William obtained very little profit from the operation, as demonstrated by the fact that
at the time of his arrest he was holding down a job as a janitor,
which paid $6.25 per hour. 111 William's sentence seems even
more unfair when compared to the sentences of his more culpable co-defendants who cooperated and testified against William
and others.1 1 2 For example, Ramon Cartznes, the Mexican
connection and the wholesaler who provided virtually all the
crack and powder for a period of time, received only a seventy113
two-month sentence.
109. The government presented testimony that a leader of the group asked
William to show someone else how to cook powder cocaine into crack. The process
of making crack cocaine can be easily found on the Internet. See How Do People
Make Crack and Freebase Cocaine, http://www.alb2c3.com/drugs/coc05.htm (last
visited Oct. 17, 2007).
110. Profile of Judge Cauthron (W.D. Okla.), supra note 107.
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. Morris Johnson, who at least for a time was the number three person in
the organization, was sentenced to 120 months. Floyd Bush and Charles Watson,
who testified against William, got 120 months despite their acknowledged roles as

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

Interestingly, while many commentators have focused on
the racial impact of crack sentences, 114 Republican appointees
seemed to be mostly concerned with proportionality. Particularly for small-time figures like William, meting out crack sentences that far exceeded the penalties imposed for armed robbers, rapists, and even some murderers troubled these
judges. 1 15 Moreover, while Congress claimed that the mandatory minimums were intended to apply to kingpins and importers, it is well understood that cocaine is imported into the
United States as powder and is only converted to crack at the
end of the retail chain. 116 Thus, the real kingpins and importers are subjected to a much less severe penalty structure than
the small-time dealers and addicts who deal in small quantities
of crack.1 1 7 For the judges who had to impose these penalties,
there was something perverse about punishing the smallest
fish in the distribution chain the most severely. 118
2.

Low-Level Offenders-Girlfriends, Junkies &
Couriers

In sentencing low-level offenders, Republican appointees
came face-to-face with the absurdities of the 1986 Act's mandasteady distributors for the organization in Oklahoma City. Three of those convicted along with William were given more severe sentences: Timothy Johnson,
410 months; Kevin Johnson, 292 months; and Nick Owens, 360 months (remanded for resentencing). Id.
114. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: COCAINE
AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 154 (1995) ("The 100-to-1 [crack/powder dis-

parity] is a primary cause of the growing disparity between sentences for Black
and White federal defendants.").
115. See Profile of Judge Kozinski (9th Cir.), supra note 107; Profile of Judge
Richard W. Vollmer, Jr. (S.D. Ala.), supra note 107. One western Republican
judge stated that "generally speaking," the Guidelines were too severe for nonviolent offenders and not severe enough for violent offenders. He noted that some
sex crimes carried less time than drug courier offenses. Interview with Western
Judge 3, supra note 73; see also Profile of Judge Joseph F. Anderson, Jr. (D. S.C.),
supra note 107; Profile of Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn, supra note 107.
116. Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Laws: HearingBefore the S. Comm. On
Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security, Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 8
(2007) (statement of Eric E. Sterling, President, The Criminal Justice Policy
Found.).
117. Mark A. Adams, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines as Legal Process Jurisprudence,31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 259, 260 n.5 (1994).
118. One Atlantic judge observed he has yet to see a kingpin in his court, instead he dealt mostly with dealers who controlled only a few blocks and nevertheless ended up being sentenced to 300-400 months. Interview with Atlantic Judge
3 (Sept. 6, 2002) (interviewee wishes to remain anonymous).
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tory minimum quantity triggers and the Guidelines' real offense approach to relevant conduct: as one Mid-Atlantic
Reagan appointee put it: "Quantity shouldn't mandate result."1 1 9 Another Republican appointee looked at the problem
more philosophically, arguing that the Guidelines failed to sufficiently individualize punishment. This judge was very direct
about her desire to "look at the whole person and not hold a
ghetto dealer to the same standard as a bank president." But
she noted, "Congress worried about empathy, so it tied judges'
hands."

12 0

Quantity and culpability collided most often for Republican
appointees in cases that involved three types of low-level offenders-those who became involved as romantic partners,
through substance abuse, or as drug couriers working for
minimal remuneration. Because of their prevalence, these
three categories are discussed in more detail in this section.
However, several other types of low-level offenders were also
sometimes mentioned by these judges including very young and
older defendants, 12 1 law enforcement and prison guards convicted of assaultive conduct on their charges, 122 and immigration sentences for non-violent offenders, with some judges arguing that since these defendants were going to be deported
anyway, the government should shorten their sentences to save
money. 123

119.

Interview with Atlantic Judge 2, supra note 77.

120. Interview with Midwestern Judge 1 (Nov. 26, 2002) (interviewee wishes to
remain anonymous).
N.C.),
121. See David Zlotnick, Profile Judge James C. Fox (E.D.
http://faculty.rwu.eduldzlotnicklprofiles/fox.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2007) (very
young defendant); Profile of Judge Marilyn Huff (S.D. Cal.), supra note 107 (older
defendant); David Zlotnick, Profile of Judge Hector M. Lafitte (D. P.R.),
http://faculty.rwu.edu/dzlotnick/profiles/laffitte.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2007)
(young crack defendant).
122. One Bush II appointee who presided over such a case stated he felt the
inmate created a risk of harm, but that guards did not stop beating him so they
were guilty of the crime. Id. Still, he felt their behavior "was aberrant and deserved less time," even if the Guidelines rules did not allow a departure under the
circumstances. Interview with Western Judge 2 (Oct. 2, 2002) (interviewee
wishes to remain anonymous).
123. One western judge noted that prison sentences seemed to do little to deter
illegal immigration and at great cost to the government. Interview with Western
Judge 1, supra note 86. However, these concerns seem restricted to border states
which saw a lot of these cases and hence did not appear to necessarily constitute a
national theme.
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a. The "Girlfriend"Cases
Of all the low-level offender cases, the so-called "girlfriend"
cases seemed to bother Republican appointees the most. Generally, these female defendants had a minor role in the offense.
They may have taken messages, stored drugs, assisted in
transport, or sometimes engaged in small quantity sales activity. However, they rarely made a substantial profit and their
primary motivation for criminal conduct was their relationship
with a man who was a drug dealer. Moreover, even if the
quantity of drugs in the conspiracy was reasonably foreseeable
to them, they rarely had any influence over the scope of the operation. One judge commented that the Guideline's focus on
drug quantity made no sense in these cases because the women
defendants are only there because "they are follow[ing] a man
around."' 124 In the most troubling examples, the male defendant was able to negotiate a cooperation agreement and lesser
sentence precisely because his larger role made him valuable to
the government, while his female partner-out of fear, loyalty,
or ignorance--could not make a similar deal. 125
124. Interview with Southern Judge 1 (Sept. 4, 2002) (interviewee wishes to
remain anonymous); see also Profile of Judge Sam Sparks (W.D. Tex.), supra note
107. Another stated that it is hard to disregard things the Guidelines tell judges
to ignore like the fact that these are "mothers with children." Interview with
Western Judge 1, supra note 86. One more was even more forthright, stating that
he felt bad for female defendants, citing his Texas upbringing, but also his views
about who is running the show. Interview with Western Judge 3, supra note 73.
125. The issue of cooperation disparity in these cases is just one aspect of the
larger issue about the distorting effect of cooperation agreements, which itself received substantial criticism throughout the Guidelines Era. Several judges interviewed for this study noted their general concerns with cooperation created disparity, with statements such as "cooperation skews cases." Interview with
Western Judge 4 (Oct. 17, 2002) (interviewee wishes to remain anonymous).
' There is a lack of accountability . . . prosecutors have unilateral discretion." Interview with Atlantic Judge 3 (Sept. 6, 2002) (interviewee wishes to remain
anonymous). Overall, however, this issue did not rise to the fore for Republican
judges. In some instances it was because prosecutors took pains to avoid this result. One Republican judge stated with mixed emotions that there was less of this
problem in her district because she believed that the local U.S. Attorney sometimes gave cooperation agreements when not warranted to be fair in sentencing.
Interview with Midwestern Judge 1 (Nov. 26, 2002) (interviewee wishes to remain
anonymous). Others indicated they would not sentence the cooperators until all
the other defendants were sentenced to allow them the opportunity to give a more
culpable cooperator a higher sentence to avoid co-defendant disparities. Interview
with Western Judge 1, supra note 86. Still others, because of a pro-government
orientation, were willing to tolerate some cooperation disparity because of the
Government's obvious need for this kind of evidence in drug conspiracies.
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Without question, the 1994 "safety-valve" law has helped
to reduce the sentences of some of these defendants. 126 The
safety-valve allows judges to sentence below an otherwise applicable mandatory minimum statute if the offender meets certain conditions intended to establish that they are a low-level,
non-violent offender. For these reasons, the safety-valve was
welcomed by the judiciary, and, despite its limitations, eventually came to be used in almost twenty-two percent of drug cases
by 2001.127 However, my research revealed that some "girlfriend" cases continued to trouble judges because of limitations
written into the safety-valve that excluded some defendants
28
who judges believed were deserving of sentence relief. 1
A poignant illustration of a post-safety valve "girlfriend"
case comes from a 2002 case before Reagan appointee Judge
James D. Todd (W.D. Tenn.). 12 9 The defendant, Lakisha Murphy, had been with her boyfriend, Cedric Robertson, since she
was fifteen. 130 Cedric was a member of the "Crips" and a drug
dealer. He was also a paraplegic and Lakisha was his primary
caretaker, who fed and bathed him. Because Lakisha spent
most of her time caring for Cedric at his house, she clearly was
aware of Cedric's illegal activities, as he was still a principal of
the group despite his disability. In the course of the investigation, Lakisha admitted she occasionally helped Cedric with his
drug business and even made a few retail sales when none of
Cedric's gang mates were around; however, when she was not
helping Cedric with his health needs, she usually had a job as a

126. See supra note 4.
127. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 107TH CONG., DRUG OFFENDERS RECEIVING
SAFETY VALVE AND MANDATORY MINIMUMS FOR EACH DRUG TYPE, Datafile
USSCFY01 (2001), availableat http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2001/table44.pdf.
128. Referring to the criminal history limitation, a Republican judge noted that
"some pretty minor conduct can disqualify a defendant" from the safety valve.
Telephone Interview with Midwestern Judge 2 (Oct. 28, 2002) (interviewee wishes
to remain anonymous). More frequently, because the Guidelines offense levels for
drug crimes increased with the quantity of drugs, even a low-level drug offender's
Guideline range could run significantly above the otherwise applicable mandatory
minimum in a conspiracy case with lots of relevant conduct or a large seizure. In
such cases, even if eligible, the safety valve would only help with a two-point offense level reduction. See Jane L. Froyd, Safety Valve Failure: Low-Level Drug
Offenders and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1471, 149899 (2000).
129. See David Zlotnick, Profile of Judge James Todd (W.D. Tenn.),
http://faculty.rwu.edu/dzlotnick/profiles/todd.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2007).
130. Id.
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cashier to support herself and was not considered to be a fulltime employee of the conspiracy by the government. 131
Because more than fifty grams of crack was involved in the
offense, Lakisha faced a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence. She also had two prior petty offenses which placed her
-in criminal history category II; thus, she was ineligible for the
safety valve. 13 2 Perhaps on principle, or out of love or fear,
Lakisha refused to cooperate with the police. Thus, although
Cedric received a longer sentence than her, four of her male codefendants, who were far more culpable, received less time
than Lakisha because they received substantial assistance motions from the government. Judge Todd noted this disparity,
stating "it seems unfortunate in this case that you're doing
more time than some of these guys did ... and there's nothing I
can do about it." 133 Judge Todd also spoke directly to Lakisha

at the sentencing hearing before he imposed the ten-year sentence, saying:
The tragedy of this [case], Ms. Murphy, is that you made a
very poor choice of boyfriends ....

I have no doubt that this was Cedric Robertson's drug op[But] a woman can stand by her man without
eration ....
becoming a criminal herself ....
But you had the misfor-

tune in this case of having a boyfriend who couldn't use his
arms and his legs and couldn't care for himself, so you became his arms and his legs. And in doing so, you did, in fact,
become a criminal ....

[But] part of the problem in this case, Ms. Murphy, is that
the sentencing guidelines passed by Congress have tied my
have passed
hands as to what discretion I have. They also 134
mandatory minimums which also tie my hands.

131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. For discussion of additional "girlfriend" cases, see David Zlotnick, ProJames
A.
Parker
(D.N.M.),
file
of
Judge
http://faculty.rwu.edu/dzlotnick/profiles/parker.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2007);
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b. Addiction Motivated Defendants
A significant number of drug addicted persons become involved in low-level distribution activities to support their own
substance abuse problems.1 3 5 The Sentencing Guidelines, however, do not allow judges to consider drug addiction at sentencing, and of course, the statutory mandatory minimums have no
Some Republican appointees
exception except cooperation.
disagree with this policy choice. For example, a Midwestern
judge stated that he although he supported the concept of drug
enforcement and harsh penalties for the top rungs of drug operations, he mostly saw people from the lower levels, many of
whom were only involved because they are addicts. This was
where he "really struggle[d] with the Guidelines." 136 Another
stated that while he is "not sympathetic to those who victimize
others," he was "sympathetic to those with substance abuse
37
problems." 1
Methamphetamine cases in particular seem to typify this
kind of case. Another Midwestern judge who saw a lot of these
cases noted that in her district, most of the methamphetamine
dealers were also users. She called them "22-year old babies,"
who were often "kids who couldn't go to college and don't have
good judgment."' 138 However, as a result of lengthy Guideline
sentences, prison was turning them into hardened criminals by
the time they got out. Thus, she would prefer that these defendants get intensive drug treatment and sentences in the threeyear range. 139 However, the addict case which seemed to most
infuriate Republican judges were the ones in which the defendant was able to successfully complete drug treatment while on
bail. An excellent example of this kind of case comes from an-

Profile of Judge James M. Rosenbaum (D. Minn.), supra note 107; Profile of Judge
Sam Sparks (W.D. Tex.), supra note 107; Profile of Judge Clyde Roger Vinson
(N.D. Fla.), supra note 107.
135. Addicts rarely make it very far in the drug world because suppliers cannot
trust them not to use too much of the product, and in any event, addicts are not
very reliable employees. See Elaine M. Chiu, The Challenge of Motive in the
Criminal Law, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 653, 719-20 (2005) (discussing how many
drug "steerers" who get arrested are drug addicts working for others).
136. Telephone Interview with Midwestern Judge 2, supra note 128.
137. Interview with Western Judge 2, supra note 122.
138. Telephone Interview with Midwestern Judge 1 (Nov. 26, 2002) (interviewee wishes to remain anonymous).
139. Id.
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other Reagan appointee, Judge James Parker (D.N.M.). 140 The
defendant, Amanda James, left home at fifteen and eventually
became romantically involved with her co-defendant, Santisteven. At the time of the offense, she was living with him and
taking care of his children while he dealt methamphetamine.
She was also an addict most of her adult life. However,
Amanda entered treatment while on bond and she made substantial progress in combating her addiction. She also reunited
with her mother, who had her own history of substance abuse
and who now did addiction counseling for others. 141
At sentencing, her attorney moved for a downward departure based upon a combination of factors including extraordinary post-conviction rehabilitation and extraordinary family
circumstances. The government opposed the motion. Judge
Parker stated that while her efforts had been admirable, her
case did not rise to the level required for a downward departure
on these grounds. Nevertheless, during the sentencing hearing, Judge Parker asked the government if it would consider a
role adjustment that might lower her sentence. The prosecutor
refused, and bound by the law, Judge Parker gave her the low
end of the Guideline range of 57 months (after application of
the safety-valve).
At her sentencing, Amanda apologized for the trouble that
would flow from her incarceration to her family. She struggled
with her emotions while speaking but was able to tell the
judge, "I want you to consider that this is the first time I have
even been in a prison. I go to school, I am a mom, I'm just
really scared." 142 Judge Parker responded by saying

140. See Profile of Judge James A. Parker (D.N.M.), supra note 134. For other
cases involving offenses motivated or the result of drug or alcohol dependency, see
Profile of Judge Eisele (E.D. Ark.), supra note 69; David Zlotnick, Profile of Judge
Michael R. Hogan (D. Or.), http://faculty.rwu.eduldzlotnick/profiles/hogan.html
(last visited Oct. 8, 2007); David Zlotnick, Profile of Judge Thomas Gray Hull
(E.D. Tenn.), http://faculty.rwu.eduldzlotnick/profiles/hull.html (last visited Oct. 8,
2007); David Zlotnick, Profile of Judge Robert E. Jones (D. Or.),
http://faculty.rwu.edu/dzlotnick/profiles/jones.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2007);
M.
Reasoner,
Stephen
Judge
Profile
of
David
Zlotnick,
http://faculty.rwu.edu/dzlotnick/profiles/reasoner.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2007);
(D.
Md.),
Frederic
N. Smalkin
Profile
of Judge
Zlotnick,
David
http://faculty.rwu.edu/dzlotnick/profiles/smalkin.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2007);
Profile of Judge Sam Sparks (W.D. Tex.), supra note 107.
141. Profile of Judge James A. Parker (D.N.M.), supra note 134.
142. Id.
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I think the guideline sentences in [regard to] some of these
drug offenses are extreme and draconian and I think this is
a sentence that's longer than what is necessary, but it's a
sentence that under the law I am required to impose....
Ms. James, I think you have definitely changed your life
and now you're going to go to prison at a time after having
done that. It's not something that's easy for a judge to

do. 143
Judge Parker's view of this "successful treatment case" reflects a theme seen in other Republican appointees with a
background, like his, in private legal practice. While these appointees tend to express strong conservative views across a
range of issues, a primary feature of their professional identity
was as acting as problem solvers. Thus, while they could be
hard-nosed litigators when necessary, as good business lawyers
they also recognized when there was a win-win situation for all
parties. Thus, while they might generally see themselves as
tough-on-crime, the "successful treatment cases" in particular
tended to confound their problem-solving identities. Moreover,
these judges seemed genuinely moved by the efforts of these defendants and the hurdles they overcame to address their addictions, particularly in a system that sees few successes at the
time of sentencing. 144 For judges who had little contact with
the criminal justice system before their appointment, these defendants may also have seemed more deserving of special consideration because they did not "look" like criminals.

c. Drug Courier Cases
The last significant category which most concerned Republican appointees was that of drug courier cases. While all districts had some, these cases were most prevalent along the
southern border, as well as in districts with major airports
from source countries.14 5 Defendants in courier cases were
143. Id. Amanda's case could also be categorized as a "girlfriend case" because
as the judge noted at sentencing he was "left with the distinct impression that its
[sic] really Mr. Santisteven who put Ms. James in this position." Id.
144. See id; see also Profile of Judge Eisele (E.D. Ark.), supra note 69; Profile of
Judge Ideman (C.D. Cal.) http://faculty.rwu.edu/dzlotnick/profiles/ideman.html
(last visited Oct. 8, 2007)
145. See Stephen Schulhofer, Sentencing Issues Facing the New Department of
Justice, 5 FED. SENT'G REP. 225, 227 (1993) (discussing different sentencing
strategies for drug couriers among high volume border districts); see also Profile of
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generally poor, often non-citizens, who were paid small sums of
money to transport drugs on their person, or sometimes by
orally ingesting them. 146 Couriers arrested in transit were
rarely useful to investigators because once the drop was not
made at the right time and location, the courier became suspect
and higher level operatives would have no dealings with
him. 147 In addition, many couriers were minimally connected
to the conspiracy, sometimes recruited abroad or allowed contact with only one person by cellular telephone or pager. Even
when couriers had more information about the conspiracy,
many expressed fear for themselves or loved ones back home if
they cooperated. 148
Because the primary sentencing factor under the 1986 Act
and the Guidelines was the weight of the drugs, over which the
courier has no control, courier sentences could be quite high in
comparison to their culpability and their role in the conspiracy. 14 9 One Republican judge stated that while he did "not
condone drugs, I think the guidelines are out of whack." 150 He
noted that a drunk driving case in which a defendant caused
four deaths had a lesser Guideline sentence than a routine
drug courier who could easily receive twenty years.
Lengthy courier sentences did not sit well with other Republican appointees. One border state Republican appointee
said that one year in prison would probably be enough for most
drug couriers. 151 Another from the same district felt that drug
couriers required some punishment, several months, but asserted that "more than one half won't do it again, once caught

Judge Eisele (E.D. Ark.), supra note 69; Profile of Judge Robert E. Jones (D. Or.),
supra note 140.
146. See generally Timothy P. Tobin, Comment, Drug Couriers: A Call for Action by the U.S. Sentencing Commission, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1055 (1999).
147. See Symposium: Alternatives to Current Sentencing and Traditional Parole, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 319, 320 (1999) (reporting comments by W. Charles Grace
about the inability of couriers to cooperation).
148. See, e.g., United States v. Contento-Pachon, 723 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1984)
(discussing threats made to drug courier from Columbia); Steven B. Wasserman,
Toward Sentencing Reform for Drug Couriers,61 BROOK. L. REV. 643 (1995) (discussing drug couriers limited knowledge of and economic stake in larger conspiracies).
149. See David Zlotnick, Profile of Judge David Sam (D. Utah),
http://faculty.rwu.edu/dzlotnick/profiles/sam.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2007).
150. Interview with Western Judge 2, supra note 122.
151. Interview with Western Judge 1, supra note 86.
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[and] with a good set of supervised release conditions and
15 2
proper supervision."
3.

"Life" Sentences for Non-violent Offenses and
First-time Offenders

A surprising result of my research was the discovery of a
class of drug cases which troubled Republican appointees, but
which has received virtually no media or scholarly attention.
The sentences in these cases were very long, such as life without parole or so many years as to amount to a virtual life term
given the defendant's age at sentencing. Without question,
these defendants were more serious offenders than the lowlevel girlfriends, addicts, and couriers discussed above, and
sometimes they played supervisory roles in their small-tomedium-size drug operations. But, because none of these defendants had been convicted of a violent offense, for these
judges, their sentences felt disproportionate. 153 In addition,
these judges were also disturbed when substantially more culpable co-defendants received huge sentence breaks because of
their cooperation with the government, leaving lesser players
to serve much longer sentences. 154
This was especially true for judges who had moved over to
the federal system after serving as state judges. For these
judges, life sentences without parole for drug crimes seemed
particularly wrong. 155 Such sentences had always been re-

152. Interview with Western Judge 3, supra note 73. For additional profiles
that discuss drug courier sentences, see Profile of Judge Eisele (E.D. Ark.), supra
note 69; David Zlotnick, Profile of Judge Ronald E. Longstaff (S.D. Iowa),
http://faculty.rwu.edu/dzlotnick/profiles/longstaff.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2007);
Profile of Judge James M. Rosenbaum (D. Minn.), supra note 107; Profile of Judge
David Sam (D. Utah), supra note 149.
153. See David Zlotnick, Profile of Judge Donald D. Alsop (D. Minn.),
http://faculty.rwu.edu/dzlotnick/profiles/alsop.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2007);
David Zlotnick, Profile of Judge Fernando J. Gaitan, Jr. (W.D. Mo.),
http://faculty.rwu.edu/dzlotnick/profiles/gaitan.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2007);
David
Zlotnick,
Profile
of
Judge
J.
Phil
Gilbert
(S.D.
Ill.),
http://faculty.rwu.edu/dzlotnick/profiles/gilbert.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2007);
Profile of Judge Phillip Reinhard (N.D. Ill.), supra note 107; Profile of Judge
Strom (D. Neb.), supra note 69; Profile of Judge Clyde Roger Vinson (N.D. Fla.),
supra note 107.
154. See Profile of Judge Samuel G. Wilson (W.D. Va.), supra note 107.
155. See Profile of Judge J. Phil Gilbert (S.D. Ill.), supra note 153; Profile of
Judge Nickerson (D. Md.), supra note 99; Profile of Judge Phillip Reinhard (N.D.
Ill.), supra note 107.
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served for heinous murderers, violent rapists, and other serious
and inveterate recidivists deemed beyond any hope of rehabilitation. This was true even for judges who articulated a strong
"just desserts" sentencing philosophy and were otherwise considered to be tough sentencers. For the cases involving lengthy
sentences short of life without parole, Republican appointees
showed the most concern in cases involving first-time offend156
ers.
Additionally, some Republican appointees expressed concerns for defendants with prior drug offenses who had been
treated very leniently by the state courts. 15 7 Especially for Republican appointees with prior criminal justice experience,
graduated punishment was central to their notions of deterrence and fairness. When a state court had essentially slapped
defendants on the wrists before, conservative judges had some
sympathy when defendants who got the equivalent of "sticker
shock" when they were brought to federal court to face the
Guidelines sentencing regime. For these judges, a severe term
for a non-violent crime was more palatable only if the defendant had been "put on notice" and had not "learned his lesson." 158 Thus, while no one doubted these defendants had been
enmeshed in trafficking, virtual life sentences for these defendants contradicted values imbedded from years of state practice.
Lastly, Republican judges expressed some utilitarian concerns about these sentences. One Republican judge interviewed stated that sentences for non-violent crimes that extended past the age of sixty were "pointless." 15 9 Moreover, if
there is no likelihood of release before death or old age, some
judges were troubled that these defendants would have no
hope, and therefore, little incentive to be "model prisoners. ' 160
156. See Profile of Judge Robert E. Jones (D. Or.), supra note 140; Profile of
Judge Stephen M. Reasoner, supra note 140.
157. See supra note 155; Interview with Western Judge 1, supra note 86; Interview with
Western Judge 2, supra note 122; Interview with Southern Judge 2 (Nov. 5, 2002) (inter-

viewee wishes to remain anonymous).
157. See sources cited supra note 156.
159. He added, "A life sentence is a horrible thing." Interview with Atlantic
Judge 1 (Oct. 15, 2002) (interviewee wishes to remain anonymous).
160. See Interview with Southern Judge 1 (Sept. 4, 2002) (interviewee wishes
to remain anonymous) (remarking that some defendants become embittered by
unfairly long sentences which can create trouble for the institution); see also Profile of Judge James M. Rosenbaum (D. Minn.), supra note 107; statement of Judge
Sporkin, Additional Statements by Republican JudicialAppointees About Sentenc-
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A good number also remarked on the financial wastefulness of
the sentence. Thirty years when fifteen would accomplish the
same goal made no sense to appointees from a party which
preaches fiscal conservatism and reduced federal spending. 161
However, because these defendants were not themselves
particularly sympathetic, judges were not as eager to ally
themselves with these men. Thus, in these transcripts, the
judges typically first emphasized the harm these defendants
had caused to their communities before criticizing the excessiveness of the sentence. One good example is the Robert Riley
case from Judge Ronald Longstaff (S.D. Iowa), a Reagan appointee. 16 2 Robert (a.k.a. "Mushroom Bob") was a devotee of
the Grateful Dead who was able to follow the band, in part, by
using, sharing, and regularly selling LSD and other drugs to
fellow "Deadheads." Before his federal case, he had previously
pled guilty to four separate charges involving small amounts of
marijuana, hashish, and amphetamines, and had spent short
periods in county prisons in California and Wisconsin for these
offenses. In Mushroom Bob's first federal case (for conspiracy
to distribute more than 10 grams of LSD), the recidivist provision of the 1986 Act required a mandatory life sentence without
parole because he had three prior drug felony convictions.
At the sentencing hearing, Judge Longstaff told Bob that
"[lilt disturbs me that you're obviously still a strong advocate of
the LSD culture, and you will be, I predict, until the day you
depart us. And I fear that if you do get out some day, I'm
afraid you're still going to be an advocate of that culture; and I
think it may lead to further problems unless somehow you
reach back and step back from your full support of that culture." On the other hand, Judge Longstaff stated, "The mandatory life sentence as applied to you is not just, it's an unfair
sentence, and I find it very distasteful to have to impose it...
,,163 Some years later, Judge Longstaff wrote about this case:

at
19,
available
Era,
at
the
Pre-Booker
ing
Policy
in
http://faculty.rwu.edu/dzlotnick/RepublicanJudicial%2oAppointeesAdditional_
Statements.pdf (lamenting the use of scarce resources to punish minor actors).
Judge Williams stated that "[w]e're building prisons faster than we're building
classrooms. And still the crime rates [sic] going up. The whole thing doesn't seem
to be very effective." Id. at 20.
161. See Profile of Judge James M. Rosenbaum (D. Minn.), supra note 107.
162. See Profile of Judge Ronald E. Longstaff (S.D. Iowa), supra note 152.
163. Id.
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. it was difficult for me to im-

pose the required life sentence. To this day it remains the
harshest punishment I have imposed as a district court
judge. There was no evidence presented in Mr. Riley's case
to indicate that he was a violent offender or would be in the
future. It gives me no satisfaction that a gentle person such
as Mr. Riley will remain in prison the rest of his life. 164
What is also interesting is the gulf between the Guideline
or statutory sentence in these cases and what these judges
would rather impose. For the street-level crack dealer, one
Reagan appointee suggested sentences as low as three to five
years (with education and vocational counseling). 16 5 In an interview, Judge Longstaff commented that for Bob Riley, he believed that a ten to twelve-year sentence would have been suf16 6
ficient.
In 1994, the Sentencing Commission partially addressed
judicial concerns in this area by amending the drug quantity
table to preclude a life sentence for a first-time offender based
solely on drug quantity. 167 However, because of possible enhancements for simple gun possession or a supervisory role,
first-time offenders can still reach the top of the Guideline sentencing chart without committing a violent act. Thus, while
judges felt this amendment made a lot of sense, it was far short
of eliminating Guideline sentences of thirty years or more
based on drug quantity and no violent conduct. Moreover, as
shown by Judge Longstaffs case, Guidelines amendments have
no effect on mandatory life sentences required by the recidivist
provisions of the 1986 statute.
4.

Gun Cases

It is an axiom among most federal judges that the Sentencing Guideline regime gave prosecutors too much control over
sentencing outcomes without necessarily reducing unwarranted disparity. 168 As has been explored at length in aca164. Id.
165. Interview with Atlantic Judge 3 (Oct. 11, 2002) (interviewee wishes to remain anonymous).
166. Telephone Interview with Judge Ronald E. Longstaff (S.D. Iowa) (Oct. 28,
2002).
167. See supra note 81.
168. See Frank 0. Bowman, The Institutional Concerns Inherent in Sentencing
Regimes: The Failure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 105 COLUM. L. REV.
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demic and judicial writing on this subject, prosecutors have a
myriad of ways to control or influence a defendant's sentence. 16 9 The most significant decisions involve whether to
charge an offense that carries a mandatory minimum penalty
or to file recidivist enhancements that exponentially increase a
mandatory minimum. Because this kind of prosecutorial discretion has never been regularized across the country, or sometimes even within a single United States Attorneys Office,
judges were acutely aware of the transfer of sentencing discretion from judges to prosecutors. 170 Moreover, judges were also
acutely aware that the Guidelines regime had driven disparity
underground, hidden in the back offices of prosecutors and law
enforcement agencies where it was hard to see and virtually
unreviewable by judges. Republican appointees were sometimes unhappy with this transfer of power to prosecutors and
offended by particular instances of what appeared to be overcharging of petty conduct. 171 However, my research found two
1315, 1336) (2005) (explaining the conflict between the fight between justice department and judicial conference); see also KATE SMITH & Jos6 A. CABRANES,
FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 130-142
(1998); Profile of Judge Sam Sparks (W.D. Tex.), supra note 107.
169. See Mark Osler, This Changes Everything: A Call for a Directive, GoalOriented Principle to Guide the Exercise of Discretion by Federal Prosecutors,39
VAL. U. L. REV. 625, 626 (2005) ("[P]rosecutors retain the power to guide investigations, accept or decline cases, draft charges, press for convictions through plea
negotiation, and seek specific sentences."); Ronald F. Wright, Sentencing Commissions as Provocateurs of Prosecutorial Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1010,
1011-12 (2005) (highlighting the ability of prosecutors to pick and choose charges
as a means of controlling sentencing); Chris Zimmerman, ProsecutorialDiscretion,
89 GEO. L.J. 1229, 1233 (2001); see also Norman Bay, ProsecutorialDiscretion in
the Post-Booker World, 37 MCGEORGE L. REV. 549, 557 (2006) (stating that prosecutors had the sole authority to file a motion for substantial assistance, and thus
prosecutors controlled the key to a sentence below the Guideline range or applicable mandatory minimum in most cases).
170. See John 0. Newman, The New Commission's Opportunity, 8 FED. SENT'G
REP. 8, 8 (1995).
171. In some cases, a mandatory minimum threshold was only reached because
agents made multiple purchases of small quantities, which, when aggregated,
were sufficient to reach this threshold. One Republican appointee talked about
cases in which it was "the agent who tried to get the defendant to convert powder
to crack or how they can keep going on with the buys." Interview with Atlantic
Judge 2, supra note 77. A western Republican appointee battled a similar prosecutorial tactic in "backpacker" courier cases in which unacquainted couriers were
recruited to carry narcotics across the border. When these human convoys were
arrested together, for a time, the United States Attorney in this district aggregated the amount of drugs and argued that each defendant was responsible for
the entire amount. In referring to these cases, the judge noted the temptation for
these defendants, stating "[tihese are kids making $200 for three hours of work
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types of gun cases in which prosecutorial charging discretion
particularly seemed to outrage Republican judges: felon-inpossession cases under the Armed Career Criminal Act and
"stacking" of mandatory minimums for using or carrying a firearm while committing a drug or violent crime.
a. ACCA "Felon-in-Possessionof Firearm"Cases
The federal felon-in-possession statute criminalizes possession of a firearm, or even ammunition, by any convicted
felon. The prohibition applies regardless of whether the prior
conviction was state or federal, and whether or not the gun was
licensed. 172 Many cases brought in federal court during the
pre-Booker period under this statute involved simple gun possession, meaning the facts did not indicate that the defendant
was engaged in any other criminal conduct at the time. As one
Western Republican judge put it, many of the defendants he
saw were "just quail hunters," and he could not understand
why they were charged in federal court. 173
In addition, many felon-in-possession cases were brought
because federal prosecutors could invoke the penalty provisions
of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), which requires a
mandatory fifteen-year sentence if the defendant has three
prior "violent felonies" or "serious drug offenses."' 17 4 This statute makes simple burglary a "crime of violence," as well as any
drug conviction, state or federal, that carries at least a ten-year

when their regular wages are $20-$30 a week." Interview with Western Judge 5,
supra note 89. More generally though, Republican appointee criticism of the government in most cases tended to be mild. These judges tended to disperse blame
for the flaws of the sentencing regime onto the Commission and sometimes to
Congress. This should not be surprising, because while a strong libertarian streak
might be run through grassroots and academic Republicans, the party's judges
were generally more receptive to claims of executive and legislative power. Support for the conclusion that Republican appointees usually were deferential to
prosecutorial power is also found in the pro-government rating for most of these
judges in the Federal Almanac of the Judiciary. See, e.g., 2 ALMANAC OF THE
FEDERAL JUDICIARY, at 4th Cir. 13 (2007 ed.); 1 ALMANAC OF THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY, at 9th Cir. 232 (2007 ed.) (profile of Judge Coughenour); id. at 6th Cir.
109, 116 (profiles of Judges Hull and Higgins); id. at 10th Cir. 51 (profile of Judge
Cauthron).
172. See Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), 98 P.L. 473;
98 Stat. 1837 (1986).
173. Interview with Western Judge 1, supra note 86; see also Profile of Judge
Robert E. Jones (D.Or.), supra note 140 (defendant was camping with his family).
174. 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(e) (2000).
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maximum sentence. 17 5 Under many state codes, an unarmed
break-in of unoccupied dwellings constitutes burglary and
therefore qualifies as a crime of violence for purposes of the
ACCA. 176 Similarly, most state drug statutes provide at least a
ten-year maximum for the distribution or possession with intent to distribute of any amount of cocaine, heroin, or other serious drugs. 177 Thus, petty offenders, especially drug addicts
desperate for a "fix," could easily amass the requisite three
convictions to qualify for the fifteen-year mandatory, simply by
selling small amounts of drugs or breaking into a store at
night.
As a result, some of these alleged "career criminals" had
never been to state prison for their crimes, having received either probation or short stints in county facilities. 178 Thus,
while Republican judges voiced agreement with the intent of
the ACCA, the over-broad definition of a "violent felony" and
''serious drug offense" frequently swept up defendants that
17 9
judges felt did not need a fifteen-year sentence.

175. Section 924(e)(2)(b)(i)(ii)(B)'s definition of "violent felony" includes burglary or "otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of
" 18 U.S.C. §924(e)(2)(B)(ii).
physical injury to another ..
176. See Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005) (holding that "enquiry under the ACCA to determine whether a plea of guilty to burglary defined
by a nongeneric statute necessarily admitted elements of the generic offense is
limited to the terms of the charging document, the terms of a plea agreement or
transcript of colloquy between judge and defendant in which the factual basis for
the plea was confirmed by the defendant, or to some comparable judicial record of
this information.").
177. See Andrews Univ., The MayaTech Corp. and RAND, Illicit Drug Policies:
Selected Laws from the 50 States, Feb. 2002, at 21-22 (copy on file with author).
178. An example of this situation is the case of Jimmy Sluder. A troubled and
alcoholic youth, he received probation for three unarmed burglaries early in his
life. After completing his probation, he was arrested several years later for possession of an unlicensed firearm. Although the state court saw fit to give him only
a thirty-day suspended sentence, the federal government prosecuted him under
the ACCA, and he received a fifteen-year sentence in federal prison despite never
having served any time in state prison. See David Wagner, Is There Anyone
Guarding the Guardiansat Justice?, INSIGHT, Aug. 4, 1997 at 1; see also Docket
Sheet, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee, No.3:94-cr-000051 (January 21, 1994) (copy on file with author).
179. For example, the same western Republican judge bothered by the "quail
hunter" prosecutions also complained that these defendants were not truly
"armed career criminals" the way Congress and the public conceived of that term
and felt that prosecutors should give more consideration to the nature of the
qualifying convictions before bringing federal charges carrying mandatory time.
Interview with Western Judge 1, supra note 86.
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The William Horne case from Reagan appointee Judge
Frederic Smalkin (D.Md.) provides a good example of this phenomenon. 180 In 1999, Horne walked past a Blockbuster Video
in Baltimore carrying a rifle. A housing authority officer saw
him and ordered him to stop. Although William was drunk, he
complied immediately. When asked what he was doing with
the gun, he replied that he was taking it to a nearby pawn
shop. The gun was unloaded, although William had ammunition on his person.
William was originally charged in state court and was offered a plea bargain which would have resulted in a fifteen
month sentence. He decided to opt for a trial, but before the
state case commenced, the Maryland U.S. Attorney charged
him as a felon-in-possession under the ACCA. Based upon William's long history of burglary and theft convictions, he qualified for the fifteen-year sentence. 18 1 At sentencing, Judge
Smalkin stated that if he had "sentencing discretion here for
the offense of having a firearm in your possession under the
circumstances that this involved, there is no way I would sentence you to 180 months. That is well beyond the pale, but
that's what Congress wants." 182 When interviewed about this
case, Judge Smalkin elaborated, stating that there was no real
criminal intent in this case. He felt that some punishment was
in order because the defendant was drunk and carrying a gun,
but that if allowed he probably would have given him a year
83
and day. 1
b.

"Stacking"of 924(c) Counts

The second category of gun cases which provoked serious
concern from Republican appointees involved the "stacking" of
180. Profile of Judge Frederic N. Smalkin (D. Md.), supra note 140; see also
David Zlotnick, Profile of Judge John C. Coughenour (W.D. Wash.),
http://faculty.rwu.edu/dzlotnick/profiles/coughenour.html (last visited Oct. 8,
2007) [hereinafter Profile of Judge Coughenour]; David Zlotnick, Profile of Judge
Michael R. Hogan (D. Or.), supra note 140; Profile of Judge James A. Parker
(D.N.M.), supra note 134.
181. In addition to a variety of petty offenses, he was convicted of burglary
(1990), theft (1991), battery (1993), storehouse breaking (1994), and two more
burglaries in 1997. He was also on probation at the time of this crime. See Presentence Report, United States v. William G. Horne, 00-4645, 4-8 (D. Md. Aug. 30,
2000) (on file with author).
182. Profile of Judge Frederic N. Smalkin (D. Md.), supra note 140.
183. See id.
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mandatory minimums under 18 U.S.C. §924(c)'s penalties for
using or carrying a firearm during a drug or violent offense.
Under this statute, a first offense carried a five-year consecutive mandatory minimum and for any subsequent offenses, an
additional twenty-year consecutive sentence.18 4 To the chagrin
of many judges, the escalation clause could be invoked even if
the defendant had not been convicted under the statute when
he committed a second 924(c) violation. 18 5 This interpretation
allowed prosecutors to charge multiple 924(c) counts in a single
indictment if the defendant had a gun during more than one
drug sale, even if it was the same gun and even though the defendant was not arrested until after the second buy was made.
The 924(c) stacking case that has received the most press,
post-Booker, is Weldon Angelos' fifty-five-year sentence reluctantly handed down by George W. Bush appointee Judge Paul
Cassell (D. Ut). 186 From the pre-Booker era, the Michael Prikakis case from Judge Vinson (N.D. Fla.) provides another
87
paradigmatic example. 1
Michael was born in Greece, and he moved to the United
States after marrying an Air Force sergeant. Although both he
and his wife were working in 1991, they had more than
$5,000.00 in credit card debts as well as liens against their
cars. Foolishly, Michael turned to selling powder cocaine to
address their money problems. Over a seven day period, Michael made three sales to a team of undercover officers. In total, he sold eighty-six grams of powder worth approximately
$5,000.00. Under the Guidelines, the sentence for this amount
18 8
of cocaine would have been fifteen to twenty-one months.
However, the undercover agents claimed he had a pistol
with him during each sale. Therefore, the prosecutor also
charged Michael with three counts of carrying a firearm during
a drug trafficking offense. Michael admitted selling the cocaine
but contested the gun counts. The jury believed the officers and
he was convicted on all counts. Under the escalation clause of
924(c), the first count carried five years and the next two
184. The current formulation of the statute requires a twenty-five year consecutive sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).
185. See Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132-34 (1993).
186. See infra note 221.
187. Profile of Judge Clyde Roger Vinson (N.D. Fla.), supra note 107; see also
David Zlotnick, Profile of Judge Malcolm
J.
Howard
(E.D. N.C.),
http://faculty.rwu.edu/dzlotnick/profiles/howard.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2007).
188. Profile of Judge Clyde Roger Vinson (N.D. Fla.), supra note 107.
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counts, an additional twenty years; all counts were required to
be consecutive. 189
When Judge Vinson appeared before the Senate Judiciary
Committee in 1983 for confirmation, he said that drugs are
"the most serious overall crime problem facing this country,"
and therefore he "would favor maximum sentences in those
cases." 190 Nevertheless, Judge Vinson thought that the Prikakis case was "[t]he most absurd situation I've ever seen, and
to me it constitutes an abuse of ...prosecutorial discretion...
to impose a forty-five-year mandatory minimum consecutive
sentence for this offense." 19 1 Judge Vinson also expressed his
concern that because the case involved controlled buys, the
government had complete and unfettered discretion to increase
the defendant's mandatory time by prolonging the investigation and making more buys. He complained, "[I]t leaves it entirely in the discretion of the law enforcement and the prosecutorial arm to determine the sentence of the defendant, knowing
19 2
that you've got this [924(c)] statute."
Clearly, the judges in these firearms cases were upset by
the harshness and disproportionate nature of the sentences.
Moreover, these cases forced judges to recognize that the unchecked power of prosecutors was being used for goals that had
nothing to do with just punishment. While the prosecutorial
motives in each case cannot be known for certain, in many of
the felon-in-possession cases, it may be true that both politics
and resource allocation factors were motivators.
Beginning in 1991, the Justice Department vigorously encouraged local United States Attorneys' Offices to increase the
number of felon-in-possession indictments under the rubric of
"Project Triggerlock." 193 Most importantly, local U.S. Attor-

189.

Id.

1ALMANAC OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, at 1ith Cir. 33 (2007).
191. Profile of Judge Clyde Roger Vinson (N.D. Fla.), supra note 107.
192. Id.
193. "Project Triggerlock" was implemented in April of 1991, and is described
as "an effort by DOJ to use federal firearms statutes to target the most dangerous
violent criminals." PATRICK WALKER & PRAGATI PATRICK, TRENDS IN FIREARMS
CASES FROM FISCAL YEAR 1989 THROUGH 1998, AND THE WORKLOAD
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. DISTRICT COURTS n. 9 (Admin. Office of the United
States Courts, 2000), http://www.uscourts.gov/firearms/firearmsOO.html#N_9 (last
visited Oct. 14, 2007). For the government's explanation of "Project Triggerlock,"
see JOHN SCALIA, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
1992-98
4-8
(2000),
FEDERAL
FIREARM
OFFENDERS,
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ffo98.pdf. Project Triggerlock continued un190.
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ney's Offices and federal law enforcement agencies were provided additional funding to pursue these cases. While the Justice Department's literature claimed that "Triggerlock" prosecutions would be targeted at habitual violent offenders such as
gang members, drug dealers and gun runners, in reality the
funding incentive generated a more indiscriminate sweep of
qualifying cases. 194 For example, in some jurisdictions, ATF
agents simply combed state court records for gun possession
19 5 If
cases describing defendants charged with gun possession.
these defendants had the requisite number of qualifying convictions, a federal indictment under the ACCA was frequently
brought. Moreover, if the defendant had already pled guilty in
state court, he had no defense at all and these became easy
cases, padding the statistics for the program.196 In this way,
Project Triggerlock and its successor programs allowed the local U.S. Attorneys and the Justice Department to proclaim
progress in the war against gun crimes and career criminals.
There were also patterns for the prosecutorial motives in
the 924(c) stacking cases that were unrelated to proportionate
punishment. Most frequently, the threat of multiple and con-

der the George H. Bush Administration. The Clinton administration followed suit
with its "Weed and Seed" program, which attempted to allow each jurisdiction to
create a firearms prosecution policy suited to local needs and tried to provide
funding for social services as well as prosecution. See WALKER & PATRICK, supra;
Memorandum from Robert S. Mueller, III, Asst. Att'y Gen. to All Federal Prosecutors,
Prosecutions
Under
922(g)
(Nov.
3,
1992),
available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading room/usam/title9/crmO1431.htm
(also on file with author) ("It is appropriate to charge a defendant who has multiple disqualifying factors with a separate count of unlawful weapons possession
under 922(g) for each disqualifying status."). Richmond's highly touted "Project
Exile" rekindled interest in federal prosecutions for felons-in-possession and
President George W. Bush followed with his Project Safe Neighborhoods, which
provided for additional funding and designated prosecutors and agents for these
cases.
See
Project
Safe
Neighborhoods
Homepage:
Funding,
http://www.psn.gov/funding/index.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2008) (touting the
approximately two billion dollars the Bush administration has devoted to the Project Safe Neighborhoods since 2001).
194. See H. Scott Wallace, Compulsive Disorder: Stop Me Before I Federalize
Again, PROSECUTOR, May/June 1994, at 21, 24. Wallace cites Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms statistics to assert that the majority of "armed career
criminals" convicted under Project Triggerlock consist of state burglary convictions. Id.
195. See United States v. Odom, No. 93-2526, 1994 WL 669675, at 1 (6th Cir.
Nov. 29, 1994); Daniel C. Richman, "Project Exile" and the Allocation of Federal
Law Enforcement Authority, 43 ARIz. L. REV. 369, 374-75 (2001)
196. See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 176.
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secutive 924(c) counts was used to try to coerce a plea. 197 In
other cases, no explanation appears other than the prosecutor
simply piling on because he or she could, in an effort to get the
maximum sentence the law would permit. 198 For Republican
appointees like Judge Vinson, who generally trusted and deferred to federal prosecutors, these transcripts resonate with
rawness and are cause for outrage. 199
IV.

REPUBLICAN APPOINTEES AND SENTENCING REFORM IN THE

POST-BOOKER ERA
There are three significant areas in which Republican appointee dissatisfaction during the mandatory Guideline era is
still relevant to the post-Booker policy environment. This Part
addresses this issue in three parts; mandatory minimums, topless Guidelines, and solutions for the discrete types of cases
discussed in Part III.
A. The Post-Booker World and Mandatory Minimums
At first blush, the Supreme Court's intervention accomplished much of what many judges and academics had urged
throughout the Guidelines Era-sentencing guidelines that are
really guidelines rather than mandatory rules, coupled with
appellate review to guard against truly idiosyncratic sentencing decisions. Moreover, despite having greater discretion under Booker, judicial sentencing practices have changed very little. In fact, the average post-Booker sentence is actually about
a month longer than before the decision-an outcome few
20 0
thought possible.

197. See Paul J. Hofer, FederalSentencing for Violent Drug Trafficking Crimes
Involving Firearms:Recent Changes and Prospects for Improvement, 37 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 41, 58 (2000).
198. See United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1232 (D. Utah 2004)
(Defendant charged with five 924(c) counts).
199. See David Zlotnick, Profile of Judge William Acker, Jr. (N.D. Ala.),
http://faculty.rwu.edu/dzlotnick/profiles/acker.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2007).
200. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FINAL REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF UNITED
STATES V. BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING 46-47 (2006) [hereinafter FINAL
BOOKER REPORT]. Post-Booker Sentencing Commission data also show that when
judges have sentenced below the Guidelines range, these downward variances
have been a matter of months, not years, suggesting that judges are tinkering
rather than abandoning the Guidelines approach to sentencing. Id. at 65 (noting
that non-government downward departures have been approximately six months).
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However, while Booker invalidated the Guidelines, the decision left untouched the statutory mandatory minimum penalties for drug and gun offenses. Mandatory minimums were not
affected by Booker because, unlike Guidelines, which required
a series of fact-finding decisions, the statutory mandatory
minimums generally have a one-fact trigger which can and
have, at least since 2000, easily been submitted to a jury for determination in federal criminal cases. 20 1 In addition, because
the Sentencing Commission continues to set most drug guidelines using the mandatory minimums at the bottom of the
range, and because judges continue to rely heavily on the
Guidelines range to satisfy Booker reasonableness, mandatory
minimums continue to impact most drug cases either directly
or indirectly. 202

Thus, the complaints in these cases about inflexible mandatory minimums are as relevant today as they were before
Booker. These judicial voices are important, but not because
anyone believes that Congress is about to repeal the 1986 Act
or gun mandatory minimums. 20 3 Rather, these judges might
forestall efforts by conservative members of Congress to try to

Even critics of the Guidelines regime, such as Judge Ronald Longstaff (S.D. Iowa),
have stated that post-Booker, "I think I'm still letting the guidelines be a very important factor in the sentence, I'm just not letting it be the only factor." More
Sentences,
From
Mandatory
Deviate
Judges
http://www.jointogether.org/newslheadlines/inthenews/2006/more-judges-deviatefrom.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2007).
201. The decision of prosecutors to charge and prove at trial the one-fact triggers was the result of prosecutors attempts not to run afoul of the Supreme
Court's opinion in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), the first in the
line of Sixth Amendment cases that ultimately led to Booker. See Memorandum
from Christopher A. Wray, Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Criminal
Div., to All Federal Prosecutors, regarding Guidance Regarding the Application of
Blakely v. Washington to Pending Cases 8 (July 6, 2004), available at
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing-law-and-policy/files/chris-wray-doj-me
mo.pdf.
202. This is certainly proved by the resilience of sentences within the Guidelines ranges after Booker. Approximately 60% of sentences still fall within the
Guideline range. Of the 40% outside the Guideline ranges, the majority are still
the result of government requested substantial assistance or fast-track departures. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2005 DATA FILE, USSCFY05, POSTBOOKER ONLY CASES (2005).
203. However, if the past is prologue, repeal is not a pipe dream. Congress had
in fact experimented with less severe mandatory minimums for drug crimes in the
1970s, but this experiment was declared a failure and these penalties were repealed. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE
available
at
SYSTEM
8
(1991),
CRIMINAL
JUSTICE
FEDERAL
http://www.ussc.gov/r-congress/MANMIN.PDF.
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legislate more mandatory minimums to replace the constraints
of now unconstitutional mandatory Guidelines. In fact, in response to Booker, some conservatives favored the mandatory
minimum approach because unlike other proposals, it clearly
avoids the constitutional issues raised by Booker. A number of
these bills have been proposed since Booker.20 4 One, "the gang
bill," passed the House but not the Senate in 2005.205
B. The Post-Booker World and "Topless" Guidelines
The experience of these judges under the Guidelines is also
relevant in assessing proposals to circumvent Booker by mimicking the Guidelines' limitations on judicial discretion to lower
sentences. As noted in Part II, the most likely such "Booker fix"
at the moment is the "topless guidelines" proposal, despite real
questions about the constitutionality of such a system. 20 6 To
204. See Gang Deterrence and Community Prevention Act of 2005, H.R. 1279,
109th Cong. (2005) (adding new mandatory minimums to crimes, including drug
offenses, committed by members of "street gangs," which was very broadly defined
and could include first time drug offenders who committed no acts of violence);
Defending America's Most Vulnerable: Safe Access to Drug Treatment and Child
Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 1528, 109th Cong. (2005) (Rep. Sensenbrenner's
"Booker fix" bill also containing new mandatory minimums); see also Gang Prevention and Effective Deterrence Act of 2005, S. 155, 109th Cong. (2005) (Senate
version of the "gang bill" which also sought to increase first offense penalties under 924(c) from five to seven years and make those guilty of conspiracy to possess
a firearm subject to the same sentences as those who actually use or carry the
weapons); Children's Safety Act of 2005, H.R. 3132, 109th Cong. (2005) (including
a new five year mandatory minimum for sex offenders who fail to register). The
latter bill passed House Judiciary Committee in 2005 but went no further. See Secure Access to Justice and Court Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 1751, 109th Cong.
(2005) (setting mandatory minimums for courthouse crimes).
205. See Gang Deterrence and Community Prevention Act of 2005, H.R. 1279,
109th Cong. (2005) (setting new mandatory minimums for gang-related crime);
Secure Access to Justice and Court Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 1751, 109th Cong.
(2005) (setting mandatory minimums for courthouse crimes).
206. See supra note 48. Many commentators say this proposal has serious constitutional problems. See A Counsel of Caution: Hearing on the Implications of
the Booker/Fanfan Decision for the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Before the
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec., House Comm. on the Judiciat
available
(2005),
Cong.
ary,
109th
http://judiciary.house.gov/medialpdfs/Bowman02l005.pdf [hereinafter Hearing on
the Implications of the Booker/Fanfan Decision] (testimony of Frank W. Bowman);
see also Letter from the JudicialConference ConcerningH.R. 1528, 17 FED. SENT'G
REP. 315, 316 (2005) ("converting the floors of the now-advisory sentencing guideline [ranges] to mandatory minimum sentences could be challenged as an unconstitutional evasion of Blakely and Booker."). It is also worth pointing out that the
law professor who conceived of "topless" guidelines now believes that they are a
bad idea and may run afoul of the Supreme Court's understanding of the Sixth
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the extent conservative judicial voices can be mustered to say
that the Guideline minimums were excessive in a significant
cross-section of cases, "topless guidelines" would recreate the
same concerns. Thus, these cases can be used to show that the
Guidelines Era was not a Golden Age of sentencing uniformity
and fairness, and that dissatisfaction was not limited to just
liberal judges, but in fact, included many Republican appointees with solid conservative credentials. Therefore, re-imposing
harsh and inflexible rules to control Booker-created disparity
would not be worth the cost to the majority of the federal judiciary, which believes that it needs the ability to tailor sentences in the unusual case. In this way, these profiles are still
relevant to assessing the judicial response to efforts designed to
undo Booker. 207

C. The Post-Booker World and Issue Oriented Sentencing
Reform
Using the cases and judges in this Article only to preserve
the status quo would be short-sighted. While the Republican
appointees in my study would not support a wholesale abandonment of the Guidelines' goals of greater uniformity and
tough sentences, Part III suggests that there are discrete issues on which these judges clearly would favor changes to permit more flexibility and less severity. The advantage of focusing on these issues is that even if these or other Republican
appointees are unwilling to actively participate in the policy
process, there is sufficient record in these cases to demonstrate
their belief that the laws, as written and enforced, are inequitable. Additionally, given that crime policy is so often "story focused," the profiles provide the concrete cases needed to mobilize the judiciary, press, and public opinion.

Amendment. See Hearing on the Implications of the Booker/Fanfan Decision, supra.
207. Under the topless Guidelines, judges would once again only have the
downward departure method to sentence below a Guideline range, an avenue seriously restricted by the Courts of Appeals and the Feeney Amendment. See Zlotnick, The War Within the War on Crime, supra note 6, at 212.
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The Crack/Powder Disparity

On the short list of post-Booker affirmative sentencing
proposals should be the crack/powder disparity. First, supporting changes to crack cocaine penalties is now politically safe for
judges. As noted in Part II, lowering crack penalties has been
repeatedly urged by the Sentencing Commission and has been
endorsed by the Judicial Conference. 20 8 Moreover, in 2007, the
Sentencing Commission proposed a Guideline Amendment
which will lower the crack cocaine Guideline drug table by two
offenses points. 20 9 At the same time, the Sentencing Commission has again recommended that Congress revisit its prior
recommendations to lower the statutory penalties. 2 10 Moreover, prominent Republican members of Congress have them2 11
selves proposed legislation to remedy partially the disparity.
In the short term, the opinions of conservative Republican
judges could provide the necessary political cover finally to
push this issue forward to at least a partial legislative solution.
208. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2007 REPORT TO CONGRESS: COCAINE AND
FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY (2007); The Time is Ripe to Change the
Crack/Powder
Disparity,
Posting
of
Nkechi
Taifa
to
ACSBblog,
http://www.acsblog.org/criminal-law-guest-blogger-the-time-is-ripe-to-change-thecrackpowder-disparity.html (June 18, 2007, 9:46 EST) (reporting that this resolution was passed in the fall of 2006).
209. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, AMENDMENTS TO THE SENTENCING
GUIDELINES (2007), available at http://www.ussc.gov/2007guid/finalamend07.pdf.
If the crack amendment survives Congressional scrutiny, the Commission will
then have to decide whether to make the Amendment retroactive and thereby afford relief to inmates sentenced before the Amendment. Retroactivity is more
controversial because it would result in sentence reductions of about sixteen
months for many inmates. See Families Against Mandatory Minimums, Attention FAMM Members: Proposed Crack Amendment Is No Guarantee Of Going
Home
Early
(Aug.
8,
2007),
http://www.famm.org/Repository/Files/CrackRetrowarning toMembers-Finaldraft with all edits%5Bl%5D.pdf.
210. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 64.
211. In July of 2006, Sen. Jeff Sessions, (R. Ala.), introduced the Drug Sentencing Reform Act of 2006, S.B. 3725, 109th Cong. (2006). The bill, co-sponsored by
John Cornyn (R. Tex.), seeks to reduce the crack-powder disparity to 20:1. See
New Crack Bill Only Gets It Half Right, FAMM-GRAM, Fall 2006, at 9. That bill,
however, did not receive a roll call vote by the end of the legislative session. Penalties for Crack Cocaine under Renewed Scrutiny on Capitol Hill, FAMM-GRAM,
Winter 2006, at 9. Earlier efforts at shortening or eliminating the disparity,
spearheaded by Republicans, include the Powder-Crack Cocaine Penalty Equalization Act of 2005, H.R. 48, 109th Cong. (2005), sponsored by Rep. Roscoe Bartlett
(R. Md.), although that bill sought to equalize the quantities of each that triggers
the mandatory minimum, it sought to do so by lowering the amount of powder required. See Other FederalBills of Interest, FAMM-GRAMM, Summer 2005, at 7.
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I say "partial," because while Republican appointees generally
think that crack sentences are too high, there is no consensus
on a specific solution or whether crack and powder penalties
2 12
should be completely equalized.
2. Low and Mid-Level Drug Offenders
There may also be opportunities for today's Congress to
provide additional relief for low-level offenders, especially those
who received a mandatory minimum because they were marginally ineligible for the safety-valve. 2 13 This issue would
likely be popular with the judiciary, and the press has shown a
willingness to give such cases favorable coverage. Moreover, a
variety of legislative routes are available to make this possible,
although perhaps the simplest would be to expand the safetyvalve to cover defendants with minor criminal records or those
who cannot give a full accounting of their co-defendant's activi2 14
ties due to a reasonable fear of retribution.

212. Some support simply lowering crack penalties to achieve a 1:1 ratio. Interview with Atlantic Judge 2, supra note 77. Some advocate somewhat higher
penalties for crack, although it is not clear to what extent this view is because
they think that crack is a more dangerous drug, or that 1:1 is politically unfeasible, or that it feels safer and less partisan to endorse the most recent suggestion of
the Sentencing Commission and Republican sponsored bills in Congress. Likely,
for this group of judges, all three factors may play a role. See U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY
91 (2002) (recommending 20:1 ratio as reasonable, incremental step to the penalty
structure); see also United States v. Perry, 389 F. Supp. 2d 278 (D.R.I. 2005)
(Judge Smith, a George W. Bush appointee, endorsing the 20:1 ratio as reasonable
in a post-Booker context), reversed by United States v. Pho, 433 F.3d 53 (2006)
(which reversed another Rhode Island judge, Ernest Torres, a Ronald Reagan appointee, who had also found the disparity irrational). Crack sentences may also
be affected by the Supreme Court's resolution of the Gall case during the 2007
term because that case also raises the issue of whether the Guidelines properly
balance the sentencing purposes in 3553(a) in the context of the crack cocaine
Guidelines.
Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Gall v. United States, Nos. 06-7949, 066330, 2007 WL 2174652, at *16 (July 26, 2007).
213. This relief might include defendants with enough misdemeanor convictions to place them in Criminal History Category II, or defendants who were unwilling due to fear or out of loyalty to reveal enough facts to qualify under the disclosure requirement. See Telephone Interview with Midwestern Judge 2, supra
note 128.
214. More creative solutions could be found as well. Defendants who are found
to have been 'low-wage" employees of drug organizations could be exempt from
relevant conduct sentencing, even if they were aware of the scope of the organization. Similar rules could be devised for the "girlfriend" cases.
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The reaction of Republican appointees to drug addict rehabilitation suggests that there could be judicial support for special treatment of drug addicts in drug cases. For example,
some jurisdictions have experimented with "addict exceptions"
from mandatory minimum penalties in drug cases, provided
that the defendant successfully completed treatment and a
probationary period. 2 15 Sentencing outcomes in courier cases
could likewise be accomplished by creating a significant statutory or Guidelines adjustment to make culpability, not quantity, the key determinant of sentence length in those cases.
The prospects of relief for those serving very long sentences for mid-level and higher drug dealing is less optimistic.
Though many of these defendants can be characterized as nonviolent, they are not an appealing constituency for legislators.
While making the Commission's crack amendment retroactive
would benefit many of those serving enhanced Guidelines sentences, those serving mandatory minimums, statutory life, with
sky-high adjusted offense levels, or with a significant criminal
history would not benefit much, if at all. One limited proposal
which might gain traction with Republican appointees would
be legislation that prohibits a life sentence under either statute
or Guidelines for non-violent offenders. While there has been
no recent federal legislation like this, in Michigan in 2003 a
broad coalition used these kinds of arguments to get the legislature to repeal the "650-lifer" law, which required life in
prison without parole for less than a kilo of any form of co2 16
caine.
Lastly, the new Congress can use these cases to highlight
the failure of the current administration to exercise meaning-

215. See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 647d(b) (West 1999); D.C. Code § 48904.01(e)(1) (2001). There might even be some judicial support for programs similar to state drug courts for drug-addicted defendants who meet certain reasonable
criteria for inclusion in a special program that avoids prison time entirely. Nothing, however, in my study suggested Republican appointees favored this kind of

solution.
216. A bipartisan majority, including the Republican chair of the Michigan
State Senate Judiciary Committee, passed three bills that repealed most mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenses. The package was the culmination of
the work of a coalition of groups that included prosecutors, the state Catholic Conference and the NAACP, with organizational support from FAMM. See Press Release, FAMM, Michigan Legislature Repeals Draconian Mandatory Minimum
Drug Sentences (Dec. 13, 2002), available at http://stopthedrugwar.org/chronicleold/267/michiganrepeal.shtml.
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fully the clemency power. 2 17 In particular, Congress could give
fresh attention to the seventeen non-violent drug offenders
pardoned by President Clinton. Two of these inmates are profiled in my study and both are doing well. 2 18 Another, Serena
Nunn, graduated from the University of Michigan Law School
in 2006. Her clemency petition was aided by the support of her
sentencing judge, David Doty (D. Minn.), another Reagan ap2 19
pointee.
While clemency experts do not expect President Bush to
increase his use of commutations for this purpose, the fact that
a number of Republican appointees have and continue to support these clemency petitions both aids this cause and sets up
the possibility for greater use of the pardon power during a
subsequent presidency. Republican appointees, especially fiscal conservatives, are also likely to support the expanded use of
the "compassionate release" program, which enables elderly2 or
20
infirm inmates to leave prison before their term has expired.
217. See Margaret Colgate Love, The Debt That Can Never Be Paid: A Report
Card on the Collateral Consequences of Conviction, 21 CRIM. JUST. 16, 16-20
(2006) (explaining how the pardon could play an important role in prisoner reentry, and that in recent years, it has been underutilized by presidents and governors); see also Margaret Colgate Love, The PardonParadox:Lessons of Clinton's
Last Pardons, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 185, 191-204 (2003) (discussing President Clinton's use of the pardon power).
218. See Profile of Judge Nickerson (D. Md.), supra note 99; David Zlotnick,
Profile of Judge David Sam (D. Utah), supra note 149.
219. See Mark Sauer, Then: Federal Convict; Now: Law School Grad, SAN
DIEGO UNION TRIB., May 14, 2006, at J1, availableat 2006 WL 8467975 (June 16,
2005), http://www.naacpldf.org/content.aspx?article630 (noting further that a conservative lawyer was a significant help in her pursuit of a pardon). Another Clinton commuttee, Kemba Smith, is currently attending Howard University Law
School. See Kemba Smith Receives Early Termination of Supervised Release,
2007),
16.
FUND
(June
EDUC.
DEFENSE
AND
LEGAL
NAACP
http://www.naacpldf.org/content.aspx?article=630 (last visited Nov. 12, 2007).
220. One such proposed bill was H.R. 3072, 109th Cong. (2005). Another was
the "Second Chance Act," sponsored by Robert Portman, (R. Ohio), which would
have created a program for the early release of non-violent, elderly convicts. Second Chance Act of 2005, H.R. 1704, 109th Cong. (2005); see also Second Chance
Act Moves Ahead, FAMM-GRAM, Fall 2006, at 9. In 2007, the Sentencing Commission expanded and clarified the existing guideline on compassionate release,
which is also known as release for "extraordinary and compelling reasons." The
new Guidelines add specific examples that illustrate the Commission's understanding of the enabling statute, including that:
(i) [t]he defendant is suffering from a terminal illness[;] (ii) [t]he defendant is suffering from a permanent physical or medical condition, or is
experiencing deteriorating physical or mental health because of the aging process, that substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to
provide self-care within the environment of a correctional facility and for
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Gun Cases and the Broader Issue of Prosecutorial
Discretion

Topping off the list of sentencing reforms in which Republican appointees opinions might make a difference includes limited aspects of firearms sentencing. Moreover, these cases
could be a platform for Congressional committees to examine
the misuse of prosecutorial discretion in both forum and charge
selection.
Legislation to prevent the stacking of 924(c) counts might
be the most realistic goal. A politically palatable legislative solution also would be fairly simple. All that is needed is an
amendment to 924(c) that prohibits the consecutive twentyfive-year mandatory minimum without a prior conviction before the offense date in the current indictment.
Certainly, such legislation would have a strong Republican
ally in the current Chair of the Judicial Conference Criminal
Law Committee, Judge Paul Cassell. 22 1 Judge Cassell received
national attention for his reluctant sentencing of first offender
Weldon Angelos, a small-time marijuana dealer, to fifty-five
years for three "stacked" 924(c) counts that resulted from a series of three undercover buys and a search warrant over the
22 2
course of less than two weeks.
Judge Cassell wrote a lengthy opinion exploring his options for refusing to impose the consecutive 924(c) sentences,
which conventional treatment promises no substantial improvement[;]
(iii) [t]he death or incapacitation of the defendant's only family member
capable of caring for the defendant's minor child or minor children.
U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, AMENDMENTS TO THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES 1
(2007), available at http://www.ussc.gov/2007guid/finalamendO7.pdf.
The new
provision, however, retains the residual clause that allows the Director of the Bureau of Prisons to grant relief under this section on other grounds. Id.
221. Before becoming a judge, Cassell was a conservative academic, best
known for his opposition to the Miranda decision. See Paul G. Cassell, The Costs
of the Miranda Mandate: A Lesson in the Dangers of Inflexible, "Prophylactic"Supreme Court Inventions, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 299 (1996). Judge Cassell was nominated to the bench by President G.W. Bush in 2001 and confirmed in 2002. See
Federal
Judical
Center:
Profile
of
Paul
G.
Cassell,
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/tGetInfo?jid=2940 (last visited Nov. 7, 2007).
222. Angelos was not accused of using or brandishing the weapon during the
transactions and he had no prior convictions. Eva S. Nilsen, Indecent Standards:
The Case of U.S. Versus Weldon Angelos, 11 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 537, 538
(2006). Apparently, because Weldon refused the initial plea offer of fifteen years,
the prosecutor returned to the grand jury and obtained a new indictment charging
twenty counts, including five counts under 924(c). Id. The government obtained
convictions on only three of the gun counts. Id.
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but ultimately decided he lacked the authority to do so. Because Weldon's sentencing occurred after Booker, Judge Cassell
was able to use his newly restored discretion to reduce the
Guidelines sentence for the drug offenses to just one day, still
leaving Weldon with fifty-five years of mandatory time. 22 3 In
ruling against Weldon's motion for a reduced sentence, Judge
Cassell noted "an additional [fifty-five]-year sentence for Mr.
Angelos under § 924(c) is unjust, disproportionate to his offense, demeaning to victims of actual criminal violence-but
nonetheless constitutional." 224 He also urged the President to
22 5
commute Angelos' sentence.
Although perhaps more politically difficult to achieve, legislative amendments to what constitutes a "crime of violence"
for purposes of the ACCA would address judicial concerns
about the felon-in-possession cases. These changes could be
portrayed as technical adjustments requested by Republican
appointees rather than relaxing treatment of career offenders.
For example, a crime of violence could be redefined to require
an actual use of force against a person, thus eliminating unarmed burglaries of unoccupied dwellings and other nonviolent offenses. Second, a statute of limitation provision could
be added to the ACCA to disqualify felonies that occurred more
than ten years ago, or more than ten years after the defendant
was released from prison, parole or probation. The latter
change would lower the sentences of older ex-felons who had
lived a clean life for a considerable period of time before being
caught with a firearm.
223. The Guidelines otherwise recommended a range of seventy-eight to
ninety-seven months for the drug charges. See United States v. Angelos, 345 F.
Supp. 2d 1227, 1232 (D. Utah 2004). On the appeal of this case to the Tenth Circuit, 163 former Justice Department prosecutors signed an amicus brief urging
reversal. See Amici Curiae Brief, United States v. Weldon, No. 04-4282 (10th Cir.
June 22, 2005). The Tenth Circuit, however, denied Angelos' appeal. See United
States. v. Angelos, 433 F.3d 738 (10th Cir. 2006).
224. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1261. He added:
By and large, the sentences I have been required to impose [under the
Guidelines] have been tough but fair. In a few cases, to be sure, I have
felt that either the Guidelines or the mandatory minimums produced excessive punishment. But even in those cases, the sentences seemed to be
within the realm of reason. This case is different. It involves a first offender who will receive a life sentence for crimes far less serious than
those committed by many other offenders-including violent offenders
and even a murderer-who have been before me.

Id.
225.

Id. at 1230-31.
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Reformers interested in broader, structural changes to federal sentencing policy could also use these two types of gun
cases to highlight how misuse of prosecutorial charging discretion has created more extreme disparities than judicial variances under Booker. While Republican appointees are unlikely
to support sharp limits on prosecutorial discretion, these cases
can be used as part of a re-education effort for the new Congress to shift scrutiny from judicially created disparity to
prosecutorially created disparities.
For example, the cynical use of Triggerlock gun prosecutions to pad the Justice Department's statistics or the use of
multiple 924(c) counts to coerce pleas can shed light on the fact
that some prosecutorial charging decisions serve prosecutorial
needs rather than the SRA's goals of uniformity and proportionate punishments. 226 As one of the judges complained,
"Congress has been dishonest with the American people. Discretion can't be destroyed, it can only be dispersed. ' 22 7 Thus,
committee hearings on prosecutorial disparity might be fruitful
to counter the pillorying the judicial branch took on the dispar228
ity issue under the Republican Congress.
V.

REPUBLICAN APPOINTEES AND SENTENCING RHETORIC IN

THE POST-BOOKER ERA
Nevertheless, sentencing reform, even on the narrow issues outlined above, is still likely to fail if sentencing reformers
continue to rely on their rhetoric from the Guidelines Era that
sentences are too severe and that judges lack sufficient discretion. Unfortunately, this approach is too vulnerable to being
branded as soft-on-crime and as advocating for a power-hungry
judiciary. Thus, in this Part, I argue that sentencing reformers
also need to borrow Republican appointee rhetoric to craft their
post-Booker appeals.
226. See Profile of Judge Coughenour (W.D. Wash.), supra note 178 (providing
an example of where prosecutors did not charge consecutive 924(c) counts but
could have).
One Reagan judge
227. Interview with Atlantic Judge 2, supra note 77.
scorned that the "Justice Department is the new emperor with regard to disparity." Interview with Atlantic Judge 3 (Sept. 6, 2002) (interviewee wishes to remain anonymous).
228. See Profile of Judge Thomas Gray Hull (E.D. Tenn.), supra note 140 (involving a case where defendant had been released and was successfully reintegrated into society but judge was required to send him back to prison after government won its appeal).
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A. Pre-Booker Sentencing Rhetoric of Confrontation
There are a variety of related theories about why the preBooker sentencing regime resulted in excessive sentencing severity and unduly restricted judicial discretion. Most contend
that these problems flowed from an imbalance in institutional
competition and emerged as a byproduct of the destructive in229
fluence of the politicalization of crime.
The most politically neutral articulation of the institutional imbalance theory looks at the differences between the
paradigmatic offenders and offenses that Congress considered
in passing sentencing laws and the defendants and offenses actually indicted by the government under these laws. In passing criminal sanctions, Congress often has in its mind the most
heinous version of the offense. 2 30 When an offender meets the
technical requirements of the statute, but nevertheless looks
very different from the dangerous archetype that Congress had
in mind, judges rebel against the required sentence.
For example, one Republican judge talked about an older
defendant whose business was failing. In desperation he
robbed a bank, but then paid his creditors with the proceeds.
Although the judge felt the defendant's behavior deserved
prison time, his desire to make good on legitimate business
debts and his otherwise law abiding life suggested, to this
judge, a kind of offender that neither Congress nor the Commission had anticipated. 23 1 Dissonance between offenders targeted and offenders prosecuted also captures many of the judicial complaints about quantity based drug sentencing. As one
Republican appointee from an East Coast city put it, "I've yet
to see a kingpin. It's usually a guy who controls a couple of
blocks who gets a 300-400 month sentence. Whoever controls
2 32
the drugs on a regional or national level is not in this court.

229. See Erik Luna, The OvercriminalizationPhenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV.
703 (2005).
230. See Testimony of Charles Ogletree: Discriminatory Impact of Mandatory
Minimum Sentences in the United States, 18 FED. SENT'G REP. 273 (2006), available at 2006 WL 2433755, *2-3 (discussing Congress' fears of the societal consequences of crack cocaine use).
231. Interview with Southern Judge 3 (Dec. 18, 2002) (interviewee wishes to
remain anonymous).
232. Interview with Atlantic Judge 3 (Sept. 6, 2002) (interviewee wishes to remain anonymous).
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However, within this paradigm, some commentators chose
to place more of the blame on federal prosecutors who indict
these cases and the rigid Justice Department policies that require pleas to counts that carry long sentences under the
Guidelines or mandatory minimum statutes. 23 3 Thus, it is
abusive and politically motivated prosecutorial decisionmaking that explains the sentences that trouble judges. In
other words, if federal prosecutors respected federalism and declined more cases (and offered more realistic plea bargains),
most of the judicial complaints about excessive sentences,
prosecutorial abuse, and the federalization of crime would dis2 34
appear.
In contrast, Professor William Stuntz has convincingly argued for equal blame, contending that the executive and legislative branches have forged a mutually beneficial alliance because both want to convince the public that criminals will be
found guilty and subject to harsh punishment, particularly for
offenses that outrage the public or during a period of increasing
crime. 2 35 Both branches, therefore, benefit politically from the
broadest definition for each crime, the fewest barriers to conviction, and the more severe sentences. 23 6 Thus, when either
prosecutors or Congress are unhappy with any subset of sentencing decisions, either can easily obtain a legislative remedy
in the form of increased penalties or limits on judicial discretion. 23 7 In the face of this alliance, there is no place at the table for judicial contentions about over-criminalization or excessive punishment.
Many political scientists and sociologists, however, see a
broader political agenda at work, attributing overly punitive
sentencing policy to conservative forces seeking a cure for their
perceptions about disintegration of community and traditional
American values. 2 38 Some describe this social movement as a
233. See, e.g., Bowman, supra note 3, at 246.
234. Federal prosecutors have deflected the blame by claiming that harsh sentencing laws must apply to all defendants to coerce cooperation, to send a message
of deterrence to the criminal class, and as a bulwark against "liberal judges" who
would undermine sentencing uniformity if given the chance. See William J.
Stuntz, The PathologicalPolitics of CriminalLaw, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 509-10
(2001).
235. See id. at 529-40.
236. See id. at 512-23.
237. See generally Zlotnick, The War Within the War on Crime, supra note 6.
238. See generally Jonathan Simon, Megan's Law: Crime and Democracy in
Late Modern America, 25 LAw & SOC. INQUIRY 1111, 1113 (2000). I have argued
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shift towards a "culture of fear," driven by both real crime in
the streets and mass hysteria mutually abetted by politicians
and the popular press. 2 39 Finally, some focus on the most virulent component of the politicization of crime-the racial aspect.
It has been said many times that in the United States, criminal
justice and race are deeply intertwined, and therefore, the social construction of crime has been closely tied to negative
stereotypes of racial minorities. 240 Thus, the fact that crack
penalties have disproportionately incarcerated AfricanAmericans involved in the cocaine trade is just the most recent
example of the tendency to vilify minority participants in
criminal activities. 24 1 And, as political scientist Naomi Murakawa has shown, the electoral process tends to reward legislators whose sentencing policies overwhelmingly target disfavored minorities.

242

However accurate these various academic theories may be
in framing the sentencing debate as a either a battle between
the elected branches versus life tenured appointed judges or
conservative versus liberal politics, both paradigms will continue to be a losing formulation for effecting legislative reform.
As the Guidelines Era showed, conservatives were enormously
that the conservative attack on judicial sentencing discretion cannot be fully understood without recognizing that it has been simply a part of a broader far right
campaign against the federal judiciary. Thus, a legacy of conservative hostility to
the federal courts may be the high-octane fuel that continues to feed the battle
between Congress and the judiciary over sentencing policy. It is only from this
perspective that congressmen like former House Majority leader Tom Delay feel
free to say that federal "judges need to be intimidated.... They need to uphold
the Constitution. If they don't behave, we're going to go after them in a big way."
Zlotnick, The War Within the War on Crime, supra note 6, at 250.
239.
See BARRY GLASSNER, THE CULTURE OF FEAR: WHY AMERICANS ARE
AFRAID OF THE WRONG THINGS (1999); Tonya L. Brito, ParanoidParents, Phantom Menaces, and the Culture of Fear, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 519, 519-20; Lawrence
M. Friedman & Issachar Rosen-Zvi, Illegal Fictions:Mystery Novels and the Popular Image of Crime, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1411, 1426 (2001).
240. See generally Dorothy E. Roberts, Supreme Court Review: Foreward: Race,
Vagueness, and the Social Meaning of Order-MaintenancePolicing, 89 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 775 (1999); see also Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Law and
(Norms of) Order in the Inner City, 32 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 805 (1998).
241. While there was some early evidence that crack was more dangerous than
powder cocaine, commentators have made powerful arguments that resistance to
lowering the 100:1 ratio is still very much a story about stereotyping of dangerous
ghetto blacks. See William Spade, Jr., Beyond the 100:1 Ratio: Towards a Rational
Cocaine Sentencing Policy, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1233, 1255 (1996).
242. Naomi Murakawa, The Racial Antecedents to Federal Sentencing Guidelines: How Congress Judged the Judges from Brown to Booker, 11 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 473, 475 (2006).
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successful at making the case for severity, uniformity, and
prosecutorial power, while conversely warning that liberal and
activist judges had to be constrained to prevent them from undermining the war on crime. Thus, even in a Democratic Congress, sentencing reformers need to shift the rhetorical paradigm of sentencing policy.
B. Post-Booker Sentencing Rhetoric of Public Safety
Listening to Republican judicial appointees talk about sentencing can yield some ideas for a more persuasive post-Booker
sentencing rhetoric of reform. First, Republican appointees
sound like the conservatives they are when they talk about
sentencing policy, despite their dissatisfaction with some percentage of the pre-Booker outcomes. 24 3 For example, they frequently stated their unequivocal support for the SRA's "truth
in sentencing" provisions which abolished independent parole
board discretion. 244 They also generally made a point to articulate their high regard for sentencing uniformity, 24 5 and correspondingly, expressed discomfort with sentencing disparities,
regardless of the cause. 24 6 With regard to sentencing severity,
243. Republican appointees probably were also dissatisfied with a smaller percentage of the Guidelines sentences on their dockets than their Democratic counterparts, although it is hard to quantify this difference. Only a few interviewees
were willing to put a number on the percentage of sentences with which they
agreed. One Midwestern Reagan appointee did; saying that 80-90% of sentences
he didn't "feel that bad about, but that he had concerns about the remaining
ones." Interview with Midwestern Judge 2 (Oct. 28, 2002) (interviewee wishes to
remain anonymous). There is one study that suggests that Republican appointees
imposed slightly longer Guideline sentences for drug and gun crimes than their
Democratic counterparts. Max Schanzenbach & Emerson H. Tiller, Strategic
Judging Under the United States Sentencing Guidelines: Instrument Choice Theory and Evidence, at 6 (Nov. 11, 2004) (unpublished paper), available at
www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/workshop-papers/Schanzenbach.doc.
244. "The major contribution of the Sentencing Reform Act is truth in sentencing. Parole board actions were hidden from the public and very confusing." Interview with Atlantic Judge 1 (Oct. 15, 2002) (interviewee wishes to remain anonymous). Similarly, a western Republican appointee agreed with the "principle of
honesty and uniformity of the SRA." Interview with Western Judge 3, supra note
73. A southern judge expressed his preference to "give less time but have defendant serve it." Interview with Southern Judge 3 (Nov. 2, 2002) (interviewee
wishes to remain anonymous).
245. One southern judge stated that he found the Guidelines helpful because
"its hard to reach into the air and pick a number." Interview with Southern Judge
1 (Sept. 4, 2002) (interviewee wishes to remain anonymous).
It
246. "The concept of the Guidelines is to promote a consistent approach ....
is wrong to be in the same courthouse or different part of the country and get pro-
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these judges made generalized claims about the importance of
law and order and the need for stiff punishment for crime; Republican appointees were also more likely to identify areas in
which Guideline sentences were not high enough.247
However, as the profiles in this Article have shown, while
these judges care very much about uniformity and just desserts, 248 their day-to-day exposure to sentencing actual human
beings has yielded a sentencing philosophy that more pragmatically acknowledges that individual cases require a tailored
mix of traditional sentencing justifications, including "just desserts," incapacitation, deterrence, and yes, even rehabilitation
for some defendants. 249 In addition, while deference to the
elected branches is important to these judges, they also have
learned from hard experience that they need some power to
check the executive branch, especially when prosecutorial
charging policies threaten the goals of uniformity and proportionate punishment, such as in the 924(c) "stacking" cases.
Thus, in contrast to the elected conservative rhetoric which exclusively emphasized severity, uniformity, and restricting judicial discretion, Republican appointee sentencing philosophy can
best be characterized as stressing "public safety."
Moreover, Republican appointee rhetoric in these profiles
reveals exactly where and how the pre-Booker regime missed
bation or jail." Interview with Western Judge 2, supra note 122. Another expressed concern that the "typical person questions the credibility of the criminal
justice system when sentences vary by judge or region, a crime is a crime wherever it is." Interview with Southern Judge 3 (Nov. 2, 2002) (interviewee wishes to
remain anonymous).
247. Some of these areas tended to be localized issues, often in jurisdictions in
which federal judges had authority over traditional crimes of violence, such as Indian country. One of these judges felt that sentences for sex crimes, especially
child molestation, were not long enough. Interview with Western Judge 1, supra
note 86.
248. For Republican judges, however, punishment is more closely linked to
moral culpability of the offender, not just the Guidelines' blunt quantification of
social harm. Thus in cases where the Guidelines failed to account for the lesser
culpability of offenders who are motivated, for example, by love, loyalty, desperation, or addiction, rather than profit, the resulting Guidelines sentences seemed to
be both morally wrong and practically unnecessary.
249. In fact, the SRA itself directed the Commission and judges to weigh and
balance these very same considerations. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2003). Nevertheless, Paul Hofer and Mark Allenbaugh convincingly argued that a modified
just desserts regime dominated the Guidelines as a result of both the weight given
to relevant conduct in computing offense levels and the impact of 1986 mandatory
minimums on Guideline sentences for drug offenses. Paul J. Hofer & Mark H. Allenbaugh, The Reason Behind the Rules: Finding and Using the Philosophy of the
FederalSentencing Guidelines, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 19, 20-26 (2003).
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the opportunity to advance public safety by more carefully calibrating the sentencing goals for particular types of offenses and
offenders. For example, for violent offenders, Republican appointees generally stated that punishment and incapacitation
should be the key considerations. 2 50 From a public safety perspective, these offenders present a risk of future harm that is
so great that there is no other option but a lengthy sentence.
But for non-violent crimes, ranging from drug to firearm to
white collar offenses, many Republican appointees wished to
have greater ability to consider whether the public would be
better protected by shorter prison terms and more concrete
steps that addressed the offender's problems, such as the possibility of serving some portion of the sentence in inpatient
drug treatment, in home confinement, or in a halfway house
25 1
with work release for those who were supporting a family.
Even for drug defendants with higher levels of culpability,
some Republican judges worried that excessively long sentences robbed these defendants of hope and actually undermined public safety by ensuring these men would be unskilled
and unemployable when released and would be a danger to
other inmates and prison guards while incarcerated. 2 52 Thus,
sentencing reformers can argue that Republican appointees do
not seek more sentencing discretion for discretion's sake.
Rather, because the Guidelines so often botched the punishment calculus, the pre-Booker regime's sentences conflicted
with outcomes which would have best protected the public.

250.

Virtually every Clinton appointee I interviewed also stressed this same

point.
251. Thus, Republican appointees do believe that rehabilitation should remain
a sentencing objective for some defendants, especially first time offenders. One
judge from a medium size city with significant poverty in the African-American
population said that he sees "a lot of inner city kids who never had a chance." Interview with Atlantic Judge 1 (Oct. 15, 2002) (interviewee wishes to remain
anonymous). He further stated that "if there is a chance to save a young person, I
want to do that but not when it's their second or third time through the system."

Id.
252. A southern Republican judge stated that punishment should be long
enough to serve its purposes but not so long as to defeat rehabilitation. Interview
with Southern Judge 1 (Sept. 4, 2002) (interviewee wishes to remain anonymous).
He said that he hoped that when he sentences someone without a tendency toward violent behavior, they would get out one day and have enough life ahead of
them to participate. Id. He worries that some defendants become institutionalized and embittered by unduly long sentences which leads to trouble in prison and
no hope of gainful employment they when get out. Id.
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In addition, given their desire for real sentencing uniformity, it is not surprising that the cases that provoked the most
anger from Republican appointees were those in which extreme
sentences resulted from arbitrary prosecutorial decisionmaking. Here, judges were faced with a regime that stripped
them of discretion in the name of uniformity but then blatantly
failed with very real and very troubling results to accomplish
that goal. Thus, Republican appointee rhetoric can be used to
argue for sentencing policies that do not concentrate too much
power in the executive branch.
CONCLUSION

This Article has shown that the lessons of Republican appointees from the mandatory Guidelines are relevant to the
pressing issues in sentencing policy today: the role of mandatory minimums, the desirability of a "Booker fix" that would
again severely curtail judicial discretion, and viable areas for
bipartisan sentencing reform legislation. More broadly, the Article encourages sentencing reformers to use Republican appointee experiences from the Guidelines Era to prove that it
was not a liberal judiciary, but ideological politicians in Washington who were out of step with mainstream conservative sentencing values during the mandatory Guidelines Era.
Moreover, the lessons of these Republican appointees can
help to rehabilitate the role that the federal judiciary should
play in sentencing policy. Simple common sense suggests that,
as long term residents of their districts, judges understand how
and when their community needs the assistance of federal law
enforcement. In addition, district court judges have valuable
information to add to the sentencing policy debate because it is
these judges, not members of Congress, who face the human
beings who are being sentenced to prison. Moreover, these profiles show that some measure of judicial discretion is necessary,
not to impose the judges' personal preferences, but to counter
the real danger of prosecutorial overreaching.
Lastly, this Article encourages reformers to adopt the language of Republican appointees-the language of public
safety-as a compelling source of rhetoric with which to break
the post-Booker stalemate. A new sentencing rhetoric based
upon the concept of public safety and real, not false, uniformity, could provide the theoretical foundation for some of the
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proposals outlined in Part IV. With this new rhetoric, Congress can break free of the dead-end paradigm that sought severity for severity's sake and uniformity solely through the
elimination of judicial discretion and return its eye to the real
prize of protecting the public.
Other conservative voices are now also suggesting that a
new direction is necessary. For example, James Q. Wilson and
John DiIulio2 53 now agree that the nation has 'maxed out' on
the public safety value of incarceration, and the "pendulum has
' 254
now swung too far away from traditional judicial discretion."
Additionally, in some state systems, judges and sentencing
commissions are trying to tackle sentencing from a public
safety perspective in what might be the third wave of sentencing reform in the modern era. 25 5 Adapting Republican judicial
rhetoric can provide political cover for those willing to stand up
to reactionary Booker fixes as well as the affirmative language
necessary to move ahead with meaningful, bipartisan sentencing reform. 256

253. DiIulio was the head of the Bush II Administration's Office of Faith-Based
and Community Groups. James Q. Wilson is now the Ronald Reagan Professor of
Public Policy at Pepperdine University, and previously served as a member of the
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board under Reagan and Bush I.
254. Stuart Taylor, Jr., Ashcroft and Congress are Pandering to Punitive Instincts, NAT'L J., Jan. 24, 2004, at 215-16.
255. For example, in the Oregon state system, Judge Michael Marcus on the
Circuit Court of Multnomah County, Oregon, has championed judicial sentencing
based upon "public safety," attempting to more systematically discover what kinds
of sentences tend to best protect the public in each case and with each type of offender. See Michael H. Marcus, Post-Booker Sentencing Issues for a Post-Booker
Court, 18 FED. SENT'G REP. 227 (2006); see also Smart Sentencing: Sentencing for
Public
Safety
and
Harm
Reduction,
http://ourworld.compuserve.comfhomepages/SMMarcus/whatwrks.html
(Judge
Marcus' website which promotes his approach to sentencing). While not endorsing Marcus' approach in its entirety, the Multnomah County experiment suggests
that a new paradigm of sentencing discourse, promoted and championed by
judges, is possible.
256. In the past, it is true that Congressional conservatives have turned on
federal judges when they have made unpopular decisions or spoken out against
the Guidelines regime, such as in the case of Judge Rosenbaum. See Zlotnick, The
War Within the War on Crime, supra note 6, at 227-28 (discussing the treatment
of Judge Rosenbaum). Hopefully, safety in numbers and the fact that these
judges did not volunteer for this Report will insulate these judges from that
treatment.

